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INTRODUCTION
In this Article, I want to focus on the "anti-Schiavo," not the case as
it occurred, but the far more common situation in which the horror and
the farce, if not the underlying tragedy, might be avoided by a different
legal and social structure.
Imagine the following "variant Schiavo." We still have a young
woman in Florida who has suffered a tragic medical event that placed
her in a persistent vegetative state ("PVS"). We still lack an advanced
directive or a person whom the patient has designated as her healthcare
surrogate. We still have a husband who believes that, under these cir-
cumstances, his wife would not have wanted to continue artificial nutri-
* Professor of Law, University of Miami School of Law. Many thanks to Kathy Cerminara,
Michael Fischl, Leslie Francis, Clark Freshman, Ken Goodman, Patrick Gudridge, and Lili Levi
for their suggestions, even the ones I did not follow. Thanks also for the invaluable work of my
research assistant, Ashley Bruce.
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tion and hydration. We still have parents who believe their daughter
would want to fight to continue her life under all circumstances. And,
finally, we are still subject to the same Florida law that designates the
husband as the person who can decide, or petition a court to decide, that
artificial nutrition and hydration should be withdrawn consistent with
clear evidence of the patient's wishes.' What we do not have is the
extreme, unmitigated hostility and distrust within the family and the
intervention of others with ideological axes to grind that made the Schi-
avo case so much more than a family tragedy.
If we could imagine this variant Schiavo, we could also imagine a
step in resolving the family dispute that never occurred in the real Schi-
avo: the intervention of a bioethics consultation.2 After briefly setting
out the relevant facts and background rules, I describe the bioethics con-
sultation process and examine how it might provide a better avenue for
reaching a decision and avoiding litigation in this and many other cases.
Finally, I consider the challenge that such an approach might entail
an unacceptable cost to the patient's interests and wishes. There is no
doubt that the costs of the litigation process are high for all the relevant
parties. Although it is a closer question, I conclude that the costs of
avoiding litigation, and thus not getting the "right" substantive outcome,
are relatively low in this particular subset of end-of-life healthcare situa-
tions. In the real Schiavo case, the Second District Court of Appeal said,
"[i]t may be unfortunate that when families cannot agree, the best forum
we can offer for this private, personal decision is a public courtroom and
the best decision-maker we can provide is a judge with no prior knowl-
edge of the ward."3 I suggest that we can and should do better; one way
of doing so is to provide a process to bring the relevant parties to con-
sensus and keep them out of court.
This Article focuses on the relationship between bioethics consulta-
tions/mediations and adjudication. There is, however, a third forum for
dealing with these issues: at the bedside among patient, proxy, family,
and healthcare professionals without any outside intervention. No doubt
most end-of-life issues are resolved in this manner and never come to
anyone else's attention. However, such informality involves the risk of
1. Although I use this as the paradigmatic case, I intend to extend the discussion of bioethics
alternatives to a range of situations in which the patient is not currently competent to make her
own healthcare decisions and where the issue is whether to withhold or withdraw lifesaving
medical treatment. As indicated later, our willingness to employ certain strategies to encourage
settlement and avoid litigation should vary among these cases, depending on the extent to which
we have reliable evidence of the once-competent patient's wishes.
2. I sometimes refer to the process upon which I focus as a consultation/mediation. Unless
the context indicates otherwise, the term "bioethics consultation" has the same referent. See infra
Part HI for a discussion of bioethics consultations' functions and processes.
3. In re Guardianship of Schiavo, 851 So. 2d 182, 187 (Fla. 2d Dist. Ct. App. 2003).
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inadequate communication, so that a decision may be based on a misun-
derstanding of the relevant facts or inappropriately reflect the power
dynamics among the parties.4 It thus may lead to an ethically inappro-
priate outcome or unneeded litigation. A bioethics consultation can
often avoid both of these outcomes.5 While such a process should not
be obligatory, for the same reasons that adjudication should not be obli-
gatory, it should be readily available whenever any of the participants
wish to invoke it.
The Article concludes with some modest policy proposals that
might enhance the effectiveness and the use of such processes.
I. THE FACTS
Without reprising the Schiavo case's convoluted history, it is useful
to briefly lay out those facts that are most relevant to the issues dis-
cussed in this Article.6 Tern Schiavo was a twenty-six-year-old married
woman7 when she suffered cardiac arrest in 1990, during which she was
anoxic for several minutes. She emerged from her coma, but did not
recover consciousness, instead entering a PVS.8 For several years her
4. See infra Part V.
5. Cf. John A. Robertson, Committees as Decision Makers: Alternative Structures and
Responsibilities, in INSTITUTIONAL ETHICS COMMITTEES AND HEALTH CARE DECISION MAKING 85,
88 (Ronald E. Cranford & A. Edward Doudera eds., 1984) [hereinafter INSTITUTIONAL ETHICS
COMMrrEES] (arguing that "it is important to have an in-house forum for resolving disputes rather
than to have resolution accomplished, for instance, by fiat of the most senior member of the
medical team"); David Orentlicher, The Limitations of Legislation, 53 MD. L. REV. 1255, 1282
(1994) (raising the concern that physicians are "more likely to base treatment decisions on their
own values rather than the patient's values"). See generally John J. Paris, The Decision to
Withdraw Life-Sustaining Treatment and the Potential Role of an IEC: The Case of People v.
Barber and Nejdl, in INSTITUTIONAL ETHICS COMMITTEES, supra (discussing the role a bioethics
consultation might have provided in giving voice to a nurse's concerns and perhaps avoiding the
prosecution of two physicians for murder for withdrawing artificial nutrition and hydration from
an irreversibly brain-damaged patient).
As discussed infra Part Ill-IV, imposing a formal bioethics process does not eliminate these
risks. The issue, however, is not if any process is perfect, but which is, on the whole, most likely
to advance patients' desires and interests, properly understood.
6. See generally Kathy Cerminara & Kenneth Goodman, Schiavo Case Resources, Key
Events in the Case of Theresa Marie Schiavo (2006), http://www.miami.edu/ethics2/schiavo/
timeline.htm (outlining the events of this case, including the numerous judicial opinions
generated).
7. Unsurprisingly, as a healthy young woman, she had never executed any advance directive.
8. See generally JAY WOLFSON, A REPORT TO GOVERNOR JEB BUSH AND THE 6TH JUDICIAL
CIRCUIT IN THE MATTER OF THERESA MARIE SCHIAVo 8 (2003), available at http://
abstractappeal.com/schiavo/WolfsonReport.pdf. Situations like this are, ironically, a consequence
of the rapid improvements in medical care over the last half-century; only when there are
treatments that permit survival in such circumstances need we decide if they should be withheld or
withdrawn.
While I later acknowledge the disputes that arose in Schiavo and might arise in similar cases
regarding the accurate diagnosis, I assume here that the medical testimony, as credited by the
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husband and mother worked assiduously to provide her the best possible
care, including a range of therapies that they hoped would improve her
condition. 9
By 1993, however, relationships between Terri Schiavo's husband,
Michael, and her parents, Robert and Mary Schindler, had drastically
deteriorated.'0 Sometime before 1998, her husband was persuaded that
he should seek to withdraw the percutaneous endoscopic gastrostomy
tube that provided her nutrition and hydration - a decision that would
lead to her death."I He petitioned the court to authorize such a with-
drawal, arguing that she was in a PVS, that her condition would never
improve, and that she had expressed to him and members of his family
that she would not want continued treatment in that situation.' 2 Her par-
ents ultimately disagreed with all of these claims and additionally
responded that, given Michael's changed situation, 13 he should not be
recognized as her guardian.
After extensive and increasingly hostile litigation, the feeding tube
was withdrawn and Terri Schiavo passed away on March 31, 2005."4
The hostility among her family members has not abated.' 5 One thing all
participants could surely agree on is that there should have been a better
way to resolve such a tragic situation.
II. THE BACKGROUND LEGAL RULES
The background rules for resolving end-of-life disputes among or
between the patient, the patient's family, the proxy (if any), and the
patient's healthcare professionals vary among jurisdictions in both the
substantive criteria and the procedural requirements that must be met
before implementing a decision to withhold or withdraw life-sustaining
court, and as confirmed by the autopsy, correctly classified Terri Schiavo's condition. See, e.g.,
Jacob Goldstein & Noah Bierman, Autopsy: Schiavo Damage 'Massive,' MIAMI HERALD, June 16,
2005, at IA.
9. See generally WOLFSON, supra note 8.
10. Id. at 8-10.
11. Id. at 11.
12. In re Guardianship of Schiavo, No. 90-2908GD-003, 2000 WL 34546715, at *2 (Fla. 6th
Cir. Ct. Feb. 11, 2000).
13. He had developed a romantic relationship with another woman with whom he eventually
had two children. See WOLFSON, supra note 8, at 14; see also MICHAEL SCHIAVO WITH MICHAEL
HIRSH, TERRI: THE TRUTH (2006); cf In re Guardianship of Kowalski, 478 N.w.2d 790, 796
(Minn. Ct. App. 1991) (rejecting parents' argument that Sharon Kowalski's lesbian lover's views
should be disregarded since she had had other sexual relations subsequent to Kowalski's accident
and noting that it "is not uncommon for spouses to make changes in their personal lives while
maintaining their commitment to the injured person").
14. Cerminara & Goodman, supra note 6.
15. See generally SCHIAVO WITH HIRSH, supra note 13; MARY SCHINDLER ET AL., A LIFE
THAT MATTERS: THE LEGACY OF TERRI SCHIAVO - A LESSON FOR Us ALL (2006).
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care. 16 Since the variant Schiavo, like the situation of Terri Schiavo her-
self, occurs in Florida, Florida law applies. 7
In the absence of an advance directive or a surrogate whom the
patient has previously designated, the husband would be the legal proxy
decisionmaker. 1  He could choose to continue medical care (including
artificial nutrition and hydration) and other family members would have
no legal basis upon which to force a different decision.' 9 Alternatively,
if the husband wished to discontinue medical treatment, he could legally
seek to do so.20 If he were seeking to withdraw life-prolonging proce-
dures, he would need to conclude two things: first, he "must be satisfied
16. See generally ALAN MEISEL & KATHY L. CERMINARA, THE RIGHT TO DIE: THE LAW OF
END-OF-LIFE DECISIONMAKING (3d ed. 2004 & Supp. 2005).
17. See generally § 765, FLA. STAT. (2006). A future federal statute might preempt these
rules; none has yet done so.
18. § 765.401, FLA. STAT. (2006). In Schiavo, Michael Schiavo had previously been
appointed her guardian; as such, he in effect occupied both the first and second statuses in the
statutory hierarchy. See § 765.401(l)(a)-(b). The statutory hierarchy reflects the state's default
assumption regarding whom a no-longer-competent patient would have chosen. As with intestate
succession, the spouse is first, followed by children, parents, and then siblings. Cf §§ 732.102-
.103, FLA. STAT. (2006).
Note that the determination is entirely formal. It does not turn on the quality of the
relationship or whether the facts show that this is a "real" marriage. The proxy's authority, as set
out in the statutory hierarchy, however, can be challenged by facts specifically indicating that that
person will not or cannot act consistent with the statutory criteria. Thus, the Florida courts
properly rejected Terri Schiavo's parents' attempts to have her husband displaced as proxy
because he was cohabiting with another woman. See Kathy L. Cerminara, Tracking the Storm, 35
STETSON L. REV. 147, 159 (2005); Katharine B. Silbaugh, The Practice of Marriage, 20 Wis.
WOMEN'S L.J. 189, 211-14 (2005) (noting that the continued formal marriage status made
irrelevant facts that suggested there was no longer a functional marriage between Michael and
Terri Schiavo).
19. This decision, like the decision to withdraw treatment, must be based on what Michael
reasonably believed Terri Schiavo would have wanted for herself, or if that were unknowable, her
best interest. § 765.401(2)-(3). If the husband and parents' positions had been reversed, however,
it appears that there would have been no proper basis for litigation. See Lois Shepherd, Terri
Schiavo: Unsettling the Settled, 37 Loy. U. CHI. L.J. 297, 314 (2006).
However, the healthcare facility or a financially responsible entity might impose significant
pressure, including seeking to have the patient transferred to another facility, if they deemed
continued care medically futile. Cf TEX. HEALTH & SAFETY CODE ANN. § 166.046(3)(e) (2003)
(authorizing a healthcare facility, if it follows certain procedural requirements, to discontinue life-
sustaining treatment they deem "inappropriate" even if the patient or family requests that it
continue). Some scholars have argued that any treatment for a patient in a PVS should be deemed
futile, since "[miere biologic life . .. is not a life worth sustaining." DAVID ORENTLICHER,
MATTERS OF LIFE AND DEATH: MAKING MORAL THEORY WORK IN MEDICAL ETHICS AND THE
LAW 133 (2001) (describing the positions expressed in Lawrence J. Schneiderman et al., Medical
Futility: Its Meaning and Ethical Implications, 112 ANNALS INTERNAL MED. 949 (1990), and
George J. Annas, The "Right to Die" in America: Sloganeering from Quinlan and Cruzan to Quill
and Kevorkian, 34 DuQ. L. REV. 875, 887 (1996)).
20. His authority derives from chapter 765, Florida Statutes. The Florida legislature adopted
this statute in response to the Florida Supreme Court's decision in In re Guardianship of
Browning, 568 So. 2d 4, 13 (1990), which found a right to do so in the Florida constitution's right
of privacy. See art. I, § 23, FLA. CONST.
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that" his wife "has an end-stage condition, . . . is in a persistent vegeta-
tive state, or [that her] physical condition is terminal";2' and second, that
there is clear and convincing evidence - based on what she did and said
while competent - to support his decision to withdraw medical care, 2 a
criteria denominated as "substituted judgment." Alternatively, if there
were insufficient evidence to meet this latter standard, the treatment
could still be withdrawn if withdrawal were determined to be in her best
interests.23
Florida law quite clearly defines who can authorize to authorize
withdrawal of treatment.24 Since the proxy, when exercising substituted
judgment, is not authorized to exercise his own judgment, but in effect,
to channel the patient's wishes, the statute permits other interested par-
ties to challenge the choice in a court of law.25 In effect, the Schiavo
litigation demonstrates that, if the family members do not agree, there is
a significant likelihood of a hostile, public, and internecine battle, with
the additional possibility of political and interest group intervention,
which introduces parochial agendas and will very likely overlay the trag-
edy with farce.26
21. §§ 765.401(3), 765.305, FLA. STAT. (2006).
22. See § 765.401(3). Substituted judgment has been defined as requiring the proxy "to
attempt to make decisions according to the substituted judgment standard - choosing as the
incompetent individual would choose in the circumstances were he or she competent." ALLEN E.
BUCHANAN & DAN W. BROCK, DECIDING FOR OTHERS: THE ETHICS OF SURROGATE DECISION
MAKING 112 (1989); see also Norman L. Cantor, Twenty-Five Years After Quinlan: A Review of
the Jurisprudence of Death and Dying, 29 J.L. MED. & ETmICS 182, 191 (2001) (advising that the
proxy should "replicate what the now-incompetent patient would have chosen if somehow
miraculously competent and aware of all the circumstances confronting him or her").
23. § 765.401. The Florida Legislature did not add the "patient's best interest" alternative
until 2001, after the Schiavo controversy had already begun. See § 765.401(3); In re
Guardianship of Schiavo, 916 So. 2d 814, 819 n.3 (Fla. 2d Dist. Ct. App. 2005). Note that no
court authorization is required. The Florida statutes specifically provide civil and criminal
immunity to healthcare facilities and providers who withdraw medical treatment in accordance
with the chapter's provisions. § 765.109, FLA. STAT. (2006). In effect, Florida has chosen, in
most situations, to designate private parties to make this decision rather than requiring the
approval of state actors.
Many such decisions are made every year without any judicial review, where all the relevant
parties have agreed on the appropriateness of doing so. See generally JANET L. DOLGIN & Lois
SHEPHERD, BIOETHICS AND THE LAW 741 (2005).
24. § 765.401.
25. Section 765.105, Florida Statutes, allows a challenger to argue that one or more of the
statutory criteria has not been met or that the proxy has neglected his or duties or abused his or her
powers. § 765.401. The procedure in Schiavo was somewhat different than those described in the
text. Since Michael Schiavo recognized that the Schindlers were certain to challenge any decision
to withdraw artificial nutrition and hydration, he instead petitioned the court in his role as his
wife's guardian to authorize the withdrawal, thus the decision in the first instance was made by the
trial judge rather than the statutory proxy. See In re Guardianship of Schiavo, 780 So. 2d 176, 179
(Fla. 2d Dist. Ct. App. 2001).
26. See KARL MARX, THE EIGHTEENTH BRUMAIRE OF LOUIS BONAPARTE (1852) (noting that
"upon the stage of universal history, all great events and personalities reappear in one fashion or
2007] SCHIAVO: THE ROAD NOT TAKEN
The Florida statutes are silent on the processes that may precede
any litigation except in a narrow situation that did not arise here.27 In
any case where there are family members available to participate in
decisionmaking, the law does not require the participation of a bioethics
committee. In Schiavo itself, bioethics processes, which might have
avoided litigation, or at least decreased the litigation's hostility,
remained unused. In the following section, I describe the structure of
bioethics committees, the various processes they may employ to deal
with end-of-life dilemmas, and the role that a bioethics consultant may
play in determining outcomes.
I11. THE BIOETHICS CONSULTATION PROCESS
Healthcare facilities frequently have some institutional structure to
provide bioethics input.28 One such structure is a bioethics committee. 9
Bioethics committees are typically comprised of a range of people with
relevant expertise. At least at larger institutions, these committees typi-
cally include people who are not institutional employees.3" The commit-
another... on the first occasion, they appear as tragedy; on the second, as farce"). In this case,
tragedy and farce seem to have been operating, at least in part, concurrently.
27. Where "no family or friends are available or willing to serve as a proxy to make
healthcare decisions for [the patient]," the court appoints a guardian. In that situation, the statute
calls for a consultation among the guardian, the treating physician, and the hospital ethics
committee to determine if the statutory criteria for treatment withdrawal are met. § 765.404, FLA.
STAT. (2006).
28. Those institutions that wish to be accredited by the Joint Commission on Accreditation of
Health Care Organizations ("JCAHO") must have some mechanism to address ethical issues.
FLA. B1oETHIcs NETWORK, GUIDELINES FOR ETHICS COMMITTEES: REPORT OF THE COMMITTEE ON
ETHICS COMMITTEE STANDARDS 3 (1996) [hereinafter FLA. BIoETHICs NETWORK]. Over eighty
percent of all hospitals had such mechanisms in place by 2003. Mark P. Aulisio, Meeting the
Need: Ethics Consultation in Health Care Today, in ETHICS CONSULTATION: FROM THEORY TO
PRACTICE 4 (Mark P. Aulisio et al. eds., 2003). These bioethics mechanisms are a relatively
recent phenomenon, most post-dating the call for more bioethical consideration of end-of-life
issues in Quinlan and in the report of the PRESIDENT'S COMM'N FOR THE STUDY OF ETHICAL
PROBLEMS IN MED. & BIOMED. & BEHAVIORAL RESEARCH, DECIDING TO FOREGO LnE-
SUSTAINING TREATMENT 164 (1983) [hereinafter PRESIDENT'S COMM'N, DECIDING TO FOREGO].
See also Susan M. Wolf, Ethics Committees and Due Process: Nesting Rights in a Community of
Caring, 50 MD. L. REV 798, 798-99 (1991).
29. The earlier sources refer to committees and describe structures like the one set out in this
text paragraph. See, e.g., Wolf, supra note 28, at 798-99. See generally INSTITUTIONAL ETHICS
COMMrITEES AND HEALTH CARE DECISION MAKING, supra note 5.
30. See Alexander Morgan Capron, Decision Review: A Problematic Task, in INSTITUTIONAL
ETHICS COMMITTEES AND HEALTH CARE DECISION MAKING, supra note 5, at 174, 181 (noting
among the values of a diverse membership: reducing "the tendency to take the committee's task as
essentially a technical one, which it is not" and preventing committees from becoming captive to
the views of any one profession or social group). Among the individuals on the committees at
some of the larger hospitals in South Florida are physicians, nurses, risk managers, genetic
counselors, clergy, ethicists, and public representatives. See Glenn McGee et al., A National
Study of Ethics Committees, I AM. J. BIOETHICS 60, 62 (2001). Providing a healthcare facility's
attorney or risk manager a voting role in a bioethics committee is problematic; he or she certainly
UNIVERSITY OF MIAMI LAW REVIEW [Vol. 61:539
tees can provide a variety of services to the facility, including the
development of healthcare policy and the education of physicians and
other staff on bioethical issues.3 Committees also respond to ethical
questions that arise in particular clinical situations. 32  The bioethicists
are typically called in when the primary players have doubts or disagree-
ments about the proper course of action. One of the most significant
roles for bioethics committees or consultants is "to resolve disputes
among staff members, and between staff and patients and their families,
over non-treatment decisions. ' 33 End-of-life situations are a paradig-
matic case.
While the bioethics committee is the appropriate body for carrying
out policy development and educational functions, case-specific review
can be carried out through a variety of structures.34 I first describe the
structure in which the committee itself serves as the mechanism for con-
sultation and the provision of a recommendation or determination. I
suggest, however, in light of some of the problems associated with that
structure, that a consultation/mediation process is a preferable mecha-
nism for dealing with these issues.
cannot ethically take on a consultant/mediator role. See FLA. BIOETHICS NETWORK, supra note 28,
at 7.
31. See THOMAS L. HAFEMEISTER & PAULA L. HANNAFORD, RESOLVING DISPUTES OVER LIFE-
SUSTAINING TREATMENT: A HEALTH CARE PROVIDER'S GUIDE 72-73 (1996); see also McGee,
supra note 30, at 62. In addition, the committees should have a mechanism to review and learn
from case consultations. See AM. Soc'Y FOR BIoETHICS & HUMANITIES, CORE COMPETENCIES FOR
HEALTH CARE ETHICS CONSULTATION 27-28 (1998) [hereinafter ASBH].
32. While this was once the "least utilized and most controversial function of an ethics
committee," Aulisio, supra note 28, at 4, it has become a standard part of such committees' work.
See also McGee, supra note 30, at 60.
33. Robertson, supra note 5, at 88. They may also be legitimately called upon when the
immediate parties do not disagree but seek confirmation from a more disinterested body that their
decision is appropriate. See generally Diane E. Hoffmann, Mediating Life and Death Decisions,
36 ARIZ. L. REV. 821 (1994). While I discuss here a bioethics committee's role as a litigation
alternative, in many situations, an informed, legally and ethically appropriate consensus decision
can be reached at the bedside among the family, surrogate, and healthcare professionals involved
in the patient's care. See generally Charity Scott, Mediating Life and Death, 11 DIsP. RESOL.
MAG. 23 (2004) (reviewing NANCY N. DUBLER & CAROL B. LIEBMAN, BIOETHICS MEDIATION: A
GUIDE TO SHAPING SHARED SOLtIONS (2004)). The participants should be aware of risks, and, as
indicated below, a court might at times be unwilling to entertain a case in which no consultation
has occurred. It would, however, seem overly intrusive and bureaucratic to require a formal
bioethics process in every case. But see PRESIDENT'S COMM'N, DECIDING TO FOREGO, supra note
28, at 164 (suggesting that a bioethics committee should review all decisions regarding
withdrawal of lifesaving medical treatment from incompetent patients to ensure they are within an
acceptable ethical range).
34. For an overview of several different structures, see Cynda Rushton, Stuart J. Youngner &
Joy Skeel, Models for Ethics Consultation: Individual, Team, or Committee?, in ETHICS
CONSULTATION: FROM THEORY TO PRACTICE, supra note 28, at 88, and John C. Fletcher &
Kathryn L. Moseley, The Structure and Process of Ethics Consultation Services, in ETHICS
CONSULTATION: FROM THEORY TO PRACTICE, supra note 28, at 96.
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Particularly when bioethics committees were first developed, they
sometimes appeared overly deferential to physicians, accommodating
their general resistance to any review of their actions." The committees
only acted at the request of healthcare professionals, typically the attend-
ing physician. Neither the patient, nor the surrogate, nor the family
could invoke the process. Frequently none of these laypersons were
notified, and they might not even have known that a bioethics committee
was reviewing the case. 36 At the end of the process, the committee rec-
ommended to the physician what was ethically appropriate.3 7 While this
decision was not formally binding, it carried great weight with the insti-
tution and often with any court that might later review the physician's
decision. Professor Wolf rightly criticized this system's denial of the
patient and family's rights; she called instead for a system that provided
them due process and helped facilitate, rather than impede, the patient's
right - either directly or through surrogates or family - to exercise her
autonomous treatment choice.38 The directive, physician-centered
approach is far less common, though it has not entirely disappeared.39
At or near the other end of the continuum of possible approaches to
bioethics review is the bioethics consultation/mediation process. Here,
the patient, proxy, and family's roles are recognized and supported, and
the consultant/mediator's role is to facilitate a decision among the direct
35. One way of doing so was to minimize any committee role in determining ethically
appropriate care for particular patients and to focus instead on educational tasks. See, e.g.,
Norman Fost & Ronald E. Cranford, Hospital Ethics Committees 253 JAMA 2687, 2688 (1985).
Another was to make the committee's role subservient to the treating physician. See JOHN LA
PUMA & DAVID SCHIEDERMAYER, ETHICS CONSULTATION: A PRACTICAL GUIDE 8-11, 52-53
(1994); Robertson, supra note 5, at 90 (discounting a physician's concern with interference since
"the physician is not obligated to follow the committee's advice").
A similar deference to doctors can be seen in assumptions that doctors, rather than family,
should play a primary role in selecting a healthcare surrogate where none has been previously
designated by the patient. See John F. Kennedy Mem'l Hosp., Inc. v. Bludworth, 452 So. 2d 921,
926 (1984) (suggesting that "[dioctors, in consultation with close family members are in the best
position to make" end-of-life decisions); PRESIDENT'S COMM'N, DECIDING TO FOREGO, supra note
28, at 127 (expressing the idea that the healthcare practitioner should play a role in selecting an
appropriate surrogate from among the patients' various family members). This trend to prioritize
doctors' decisional importance, rather than the family's, is striking, though it parallels Justice
Blackmun's approach to the abortion issue in Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113 (1973).
36. See LA PUMA & SCHIEDERMAYER, supra note 35, at 12-13 (providing reasons for seeing
the patient and implicitly responding to resistances to doing so, but stating that the consulted
bioethicist need not see the patient if the healthcare professional "wants only an educational
primer").
37. The healthcare professionals were seen as the "client," who could request the review and
to whom the committee reported. See, e.g., John A. Robertson, Committees as Decision Makers:
Alternative Structures and Responsibilities, in INSTITUTIONAL ETHICS COMMIrrEES AND HEALTH
CARE DECISION MAKING, supra note 5, at 85, 87-89 (describing the operation of such a model).
38. See generally Wolf, supra note 28.
39. McGee, supra note 30, at 61, notes that five percent of the ethics committees surveyed
indicated that they sometimes issued binding decisions.
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participants rather than to impose his or her own view of the ethically
correct outcome. There are a wide range of possible structures for carry-
ing out a consultation/mediation. n The body entrusted to carry out the
process might be the institution's bioethics committee, a subset thereof,
or even a single person. The intervention might take place at different
stages; it might be relatively active or passive, and the persons who can
invoke it or participate in it might vary. The outcome might vary as
well, taking the form of a decision, recommendation, or facilitation of a
decision by the direct participants.41
Those engaged in the bioethics process must individually or collec-
tively possess certain skills and knowledge.42 They must have sufficient
knowledge of medical concepts and terminology to understand, and to
ensure that the lay participants understand, the relevant medical con-
text. 43 The participants should also know the specific policies that their
institution has adopted and should have at least a general understanding
of the legal framework within which they are operating." Moreover,
40. See generally Fletcher & Moseley, supra note 34; Rushton et al., supra note 34. Some
structures seem to fit more naturally with some tasks. For example, when the group is asked to
review a physician's decision or issue their own determination of the ethically appropriate action,
the committee as a whole will bring a greater range of expertise and views to that task. On the
other hand, an individual or a small group is better suited to listen, facilitate communication, and,
if possible, bring all the participants to consensus. LA PUMA & SCHIEDERMAYER, supra note 35, at
100-02 (describing one system in which the consultant and committee take on distinct but
mutually supportive roles).
41. See Nancy N. Dubler & Carol B. Liebman, Bioethics: Mediating Conflict in the Hospital
Environment, 59 Disp. RESOL. J. 32, 36 (2004) ("One of the greatest advantages of using the
mediation process in bioethics disputes is that the process is flexible. The general structure of
mediation can be adapted and altered to fit the needs of the participants. But the starting point is
always the same: respect for the patient, the family and the care providers, as well as an impartial
stance regarding what should be the outcome in any particular case."). Other commentators have
described an approach in which a single consultant works with the attending physician, patient,
and others at the bedside and formulates a specific recommendation or set of recommendations,
which are communicated to the attending physician and included in the medical record, without
any separate role for a bioethics committee. See generally LA PUMA & SCHIEDERMAYER, supra
note 35.
42. ASBH, supra note 31, at 15-18 (delineating those competencies, both skills and
knowledge, that all participants in the process must possess and those that at least some must
possess).
43. Scholars dispute how crucial it is that an ethics consultant be a clinician. Compare John
La Puma & Stephen E. Toulmin, Ethics Consultants and Ethics Committees, 149 ARCHIVES
INTERNAL MED. 1109, 1110 (1989) (arguing that the consultant should be a clincian, which they
define as someone who "understands a particular patient's history, personal situation, and medical
illness sufficiently well to help in managing the illness. A clinician is an experienced professional
who attends and becomes involved with individual patients regularly"), with ASBH, supra note
31, at 11-12 (indicating that consultants who are lawyers or philosophers might need "to acquire
basic knowledge of the clinical context"). While there is value in having a trained clinician/
physician as part of a group, if a consultant/mediator is a clinician/physician there is a risk that the
family may defer too easily to what they perceive as his or her views.
44. ASBH, supra note 31, at 5.
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they must also remember that neither law nor institutional policies are
determinative of ethically acceptable outcomes.45
Perhaps most important, the bioethicists must possess both an ade-
quate knowledge of general bioethics principles and the ability to apply
them. There are four basic principles that inform bioethical decision-
making: (1) patient autonomy; (2) beneficence; (3) nonmaleficence; and
(4) social or distributive justice.4 6 In the context of decisions on particu-
lar cases, patient autonomy is generally assumed to be of paramount
importance.47 Where the patient's views have not been clearly
expressed, however, the other values may properly have a greater role.48
The consultant should also have the requisite interpersonal skills to
facilitate the needed communication among the parties.4 9 These skills
can be learned and consultants should engage in continuing study to
maintain and enhance their relevant knowledge and skills.
As noted earlier, hospitals vary regarding who can invoke a
bioethics process; almost all of them authorize any healthcare profes-
sional involved in the patient's care to invoke the process, although it is
most commonly the attending physician who does so.50 Many of those
45. That law and ethics are distinct is a truism; if a citation were necessary, it could simply be
"cf the debates over abortion or stem-cell research."
46. See TOM L. BEAUCHAMP & JAMES F. CHILDRESS, PRINCIPLES OF BIOMEDICAL ETHICS 12
(3d ed. 1989). I collapse nonmaleficence into beneficence, creating three principles, following
BUCHANAN & BROCK, supra note 22, at 87, who describe the three basic ethical values in this
context as "respect for individual self-determination" (autonomy), "concern for the individual's
well-being" (nonmaleficence and beneficence), and "distributive justice." Id.
47. See MEISEL & CERMINARA, supra note 16, at 4-7; H. TRISTRAM ENGELHARDT, JR., THE
FOUNDATIONS OF BIOETHICs 122-23 (2d ed. 1996). But see Carl E. Schneider, After Autonomy, 41
WAKE FOREST L. REv. 411, 413 (2006) (criticizing the dominant bioethics approach as elevating
autonomy over beneficence and social justice, particularly in light of the difficulty of
implementing the autonomy principle in the real world). See generally Rebecca Dresser,
Precommitment: A Misguided Strategy for Securing Death with Dignity, 81 TEX. L. REV. 1823
(2003) (stressing the importance of beneficence and social justice concerns in decisions over
withdrawal of lifesaving medical treatment). Some writers have noted that the current structure
makes it difficult to recognize openly the resource limitations that might be relevant to treatment
withholding issues if social justice were acknowledged as a legitimate criterion. See infra Part VII
and accompanying footnotes (discussing the various claims scholars have made regarding the
ethically appropriate criteria to guide end-of-life decisionmaking). See generally George J.
Alexander, Death by Directive, 28 SANTA CLARA L. REV. 67 (1988).
48. The law, too, permits consideration of the patient's best interest (beneficence) where the
patient's actual wishes cannot be known with sufficient clarity. See, e.g., § 765.401(2) FLA. STAT.
(2006).
49. See, e.g., DUBLER & LIEBMAN, supra note 33, at 35-39.
50. LA PUMA & SCHIEDERMAYER, supra note 35, at 3; John A. McClung et al., Evaluation of
a Medical Ethics Consultation Service: Opinions of Patients and Health Care Providers, 100 AM.
J. MED. 456, 456 (1996). Indeed, Buchanan suggests that one of bioethics structures' significant
roles is to provide healthcare professionals a means of challenging a surrogate's decision as
inconsistent with the healthcare professional's view of the patient's best interests. Allen E.
Buchanan, Limitations on the Family's Right to Decide for the Incompetent Patient, in
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who have written about bioethics committees - and particularly those
who discuss the desirability of a consultation/mediation process - urge
that all healthcare facilities adopt the practice of permitting the patient or
a family member to call for a consultation.5' Ideally the facility should
engage in outreach to ensure that patients and families are aware of the
availability of bioethics consultations.52
Once a consultation has been requested, the question arises of who
should participate. It is fundamental that the patient, if competent, be
permitted to do so. 3 Furthermore, even patients who are not fully com-
petent to make a treatment decision should be included to the maximum
extent possible whenever they have some cognitive capacity.54 If there
is a legal guardian or a patient-appointed surrogate, that person should
participate. 55 The healthcare personnel involved in caring for the patient
are also necessary participants.56
If the consultation/mediation is to achieve its goals, scholars all
INSTITUTIONAL ETHICS COMMITTEES AND HEALTH CARE DECISION MAKING, supra note 5, at 209,
211-16.
51. HAFEMEISTER & HANNAFORD, supra note 31, at 79-80; Fletcher & Moseley, supra note
34, at 99. In contrast to the earlier study by Youngner (Stuart Youngner et al., A National Survey
of Hospital Ethics Committees, 11 CRITICAL CARE MED. 902 (1983)), McGee et al. found in 2001
that over ninety percent of responding hospitals permitted patients, family members, nurses, and
hospital staff as well as physicians to request a consultation. See McGee, supra note 30, at 62.
52. FLA. BIOETHICS NETWORK, supra note 28, at 19.
53. See, e.g., Glenn Cohen, Negotiating Death: ADR and End of Life Decision-Making, 9
HARV. NEGOT. L. REV. 253, 296 (2004). Ordinarily, the consultation cannot proceed without a
competent patient's consent. The healthcare providers might, however, seek ethics guidance on
certain questions that are essentially medical in nature without the patient's approval, if they do so
without identifying the specific patient involved. This exception, however, never includes
decisions whether to withdraw life-sustaining treatment.
Bioethics committees (in contrast to consultants) should and ordinarily do involve the patient
or family in their clinical case review proceeses. Again, when they do not, because they are acting
only as a source of advice to the healthcare personnel, it is crucial that this role be cabined and any
such advice not be accorded special weight in a dispute with the patient or family. Cf. Wolf,
supra note 28, at 822-24.
54. Greg A. Sachs & Mark Siegler, Guidelines for Decision Making When the Patient Is
Incompetent, 6 J. CRITICAL ILLNESS 348, 348-49 (1991) (noting that the issue is not legal
competency, but more concrete and specific capacities to understand and communicate); see also
HAFEMEISTER & HANNAFORD, supra note 31, at 81-83; cf In re Guardianship of Kowalski, 478
N.W.2d 790, 793 (Minn. Ct. App. 1991) (taking into consideration the patient's expressed wishes
regarding future care, although she was severely disabled and not legally competent). This caveat
is, of course, inapplicable to patients in a coma or a PVS.
55. See Robert M. Veatch, Advice and Consent, HASTINGS CmR. RaP., Jan.-Feb. 1989, at 20
(arguing that discussion in the absence of the surrogate or patient is "unacceptable").
56. As one author notes, the consultant should particularly seek to involve the nurses. Unlike
attending physicians, nurses frequently provide: (1) insight into treatment's impact on the patient's
day-to-day experiences; (2) advocacy for consideration of the patient's physical condition; and (3)
an ability to communicate more comfortably with the family. See Bernard Lo, Behind Closed
Doors, 317 NEW ENG J. MED. 46 (1987).
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assume or assert that the patient's family should be included.57 Two
questions then arise: who should count as family and, thus, as partici-
pants, and, more fundamentally, why should family members have this
role? The literature on bioethics processes and end-of-life decisionmak-
ing sometimes speaks of "the family" in broad terms, neither carefully
parsing particular relationships nor limiting the concept to legally
defined relationships. For example, one pair of authors has stated that
"the appropriate presumption is that the family ... is to be the principal
decision-maker."58 While formal family status matters legally, most
patients want their close family members included, which for them may
be defined functionally. By not limiting the process to the legal surro-
gate, the bioethics consultation can bring in "whomever the individual is
most closely associated with. '59 One scholar suggests a definition of
family for this purpose as those who self-identify and become involved
at the hospital.60
Why involve the family rather than merely the legal surrogate in
the consultation process? First, family members are the people who are
most likely to have knowledge about the patient's values and prefer-
ences and to be concerned about advancing her welfare - in part because
family is a place where many people find or construct meaning in their
lives. Different family members may bring different perspectives and
knowledge of different facts, all of which reflect aspects of the patient's
57. Id. Some of the earlier, more physician-deferent literature, when discussing a bioethics
committee process, suggested a more limited role for patient and family. See Fost & Cranford,
supra note 35, at 2869 (family should be permitted to participate in discussions "when they insist
upon it"). See generally LA PUMA & SCHIEDERMAYER, supra note 35.
58. BUCHANAN & BROCK, supra note 22, at 136; see also Steven A. Newman, Treatment
Refusals for the Critically and Terminally Ill: Proposed Rules for the Family, the Physician and
the State, 3 N.Y.L. SCH. HUM. RTs. ANN. 35, 49-50 (1986) (stressing the need for engaging the
family).
59. BUCHANAN & BROCK, supra note 22, at 136.
60. HAPEMEISTER & HANNAFORD, supra note 31, at 56; see also Jacqueline J. Glover, Should
Families Make Health Care Decisions?, 53 MD. L. REv. 1158, 1160 (1994) (suggesting that the
boundaries of family should be defined by "those relationships that are long-term and
characterized by such things as interdependence, dedication, caring, and self-sacrifice"). Those
recognized as the surrogate are statutorily defined in a way that privileges formal family
relationships. An expanded definition of "family," however, could encompass those whom the
individual patient thinks of as her intimates or her "real family." These may include extended
family, functional kin, or intimates who are not so recognized by law, regardless of sexual
orientation. A consultant need not be as concerned with drawing precise boundaries as a judge
who must decide who has the right to participate in litigation.
In a situation unlike Schiavo, where the end-of-life problem arises relatively abruptly - for
example, after an accident with major head injuries - a balance should be sought between the
need, if any, for rapid decisionmaking and the desirability of notifying and involving all close
family members, if possible. In a Schiavo situation, however, there is no time constraint, and thus
the consultant should work with those present to determine what other family members the patient
would wish to have involved and should then invite them to participate.
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own history and views. Thus, including them is likely to make for a
better decision in terms of the underlying criteria of furthering the
patient's autonomy and welfare.6' Second, "most Americans want the
decisions about their care, upon their incapacity, to be made for them by
family and physician, rather than by strangers or by the government.
62
Such an inclusive process is consistent with most patients' expecta-
tions.6 3 In a study of competent elderly patients, many indicated that
they wanted their spouses or adult children to serve as their surrogates,
but they also wanted the surrogate to make treatment decisions together
with other close family members.' Finally, bringing a full range of
family members into the process can enhance the outcome's acceptabil-
ity and deter litigation.
Having determined that a consultation will occur, and who the par-
ticipants will be, the next issue is what will happen during the consulta-
tion. The ultimate goal is to bring the parties to a consensus, if possible,
regarding an appropriate resolution. The process of getting there may
take various forms: the consultant can seek to bring all the interested
parties into a single discussion or engage in a series of consultations
with different "players. 65 Similarly, there is no fixed rule about where
to hold the discussions or the degree of formality.
The process should reflect the somewhat hybrid nature of a consul-
tation/mediation. While the process resembles a mediation in some
ways, particularly the consultant/mediator's relatively non-directive role,
61. Duncan Joseph Moore, Medical Surrogacy Mediation: Expanding Patient, Family, and
Physician Rights and Reformulating the Virginia Health Care Decisions Act, 10 VA. J. SoC.
POL'Y & L. 410, 435-36 (2003).
62. In re Guardianship of Lawrance, 579 N.E.2d 32, 39 (Ind. 1991).
63. There are people who do not wish to have some or all of their family members, including
those who would be recognized as the surrogate under governing statutes, participate in deciding
whether they should continue to receive lifesaving medical treatment. It would, however, be
legally problematic for the healthcare professionals or consultant to exclude those whom the law
includes. Those who desire such exclusion can do so by clearly expressing these wishes - either
as part of an advance directive or, if they retain some communicative capacity, at the time the
issue is under consideration. When the patient seeks to exclude someone who is not the legally
recognized proxy, her wishes should ordinarily be honored. Without such direct evidence,
consultants might sensibly hesitate to exclude family members from the process, although a judge
might decide to prefer the positions articulated by non-kin intimates over those of legal family
based on sufficiently clear evidence of the patient's views and life choices. See James A. Becker,
Note, Healthcare Surrogacy Laws: Implications for Gay and Lesbian Families, 35 U. LOuiSVILLE
J. FAM. L. 97, 112-14 (1996) (discussing the court's preference in In re Guardianship of Kowalski,
478 N.W.2d 790 (Minn. Ct. App. 1991), for Kowalski's long-term lesbian lover rather than her
father as guardian).
64. Dallas M. High, All in the Family: Extended Autonomy and Expectations in Surrogate
Health Care Decision-Making, 28 GERorOLOGIST 46, 49-50 (1988) (emphasis supplied).
65. For example, DUBLER & LIEBMAN, supra note 33, at 52, 55-56, suggest a meeting at an
early stage with the healthcare team to learn the medical facts and to help determine which
healthcare professionals ought to participate in later discussions with the family.
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it also differs significantly from classic mediation. The person for
whom the outcome is most important, the patient, often cannot partici-
pate. The mediator/consultant has a continuing relationship with the
healthcare personnel, while patients and families are unlikely to partici-
pate in such a process more than once. 66 Deciding not to decide is not
an option.6 7 This hybridity requires awareness of the ways in which the
advantages and disadvantages of consultation/mediation may counter or
reinforce each other.
Substantively, these discussions should focus on obtaining and
sharing, first, the needed information about the patient's condition, prog-
nosis, and treatment options, and then information about the patient's
wishes and values. This involves facilitating discussions among and
between the healthcare personnel, the patient, proxy, and family. Each
of those discussions can present challenges.
As to the medical facts, the attending physician and other health-
care professionals will be the most knowledgeable. In the simplest case,
these people agree, and the facts are clear. The consultant/mediator may
nonetheless have to play an active role in ensuring that the medical facts
are presented to the lay participants in a way they can understand. This
requires recognizing and responding to both the patient/family's lack of
familiarity with medical concepts and terminology and the situation's
emotional intensity, which may make it difficult for the participants to
hear and understand.68 Sometimes what seem to be irrevocable conflicts
among some or all of the participants have "their origins in mispercep-
tions, misunderstandings, and miscommunication," which may be
resolved by a trained bioethics consultant's intervention.69
In many situations, however, even where the healthcare profession-
als are in agreement, they do not know, or at least know with a great
deal of certainty, what the medical facts are. They may agree that a
particular treatment is unlikely to improve the patient's condition, or
even what the probabilities of success are. But probabilistic facts may
be especially difficult to communicate to patients and their families, who
might find it extraordinarily difficult to integrate such facts into the task
66. Thus, the healthcare professionals may possess some undeserved procedural advantages
that accrue to "repeat players" in litigation and arbitration. See, e.g., Marc Galanter, Why the
"Haves" Come Out Ahead: Speculations on the Limits of Legal Change, 9 LAW & Soc'v REv. 95,
97 (1974); Carrie Menkel-Meadow, Do the "Haves" Come Out Ahead in Alternative Judicial
Systems?: Repeat Players in ADR, 15 OHIO ST. J. ON Disp. RESOL. 19, 20 (1999).
67. These are among a long list of distinctions set out in DUBLER & LIEBMAN, supra note 33,
at 21-31.
68. Nancy N. Dubler, Heroic Care Cases: When Difficult Decisions About Care Are Near,
Mediation Can Help Bridge Communications Gap, 5 Disp. RESOL. MAG. 7, 8 (1999).
69. Sachs & Siegler, supra note 54, at 356; see also Dubler, supra note 68, at 7; Lo, supra
note 56, at 2.
2007]
UNIVERSITY OF MIAMI LAW REVIEW
of choosing whether to withhold or withdraw treatment.70 Nonetheless,
since "treatment decisions for the severely, hopelessly ill turn not merely
on medical data but on moral and ethical values" as well, the degree of
medical certainty must be clearly communicated if patient, proxy, and
family are effectively to make choices.7 Finally, the healthcare profes-
sionals may disagree about the patient's diagnosis, prognosis, or treat-
ment options. Despite the hopes of the proponents of evidence-based
medicine, most clinical medicine cannot be reduced to irrefutable
answers determined by computers.72 In such situations, patient and fam-
ily may already have heard conflicting stories from different members of
the treatment team. Compounding the problem of unclear communica-
tion, healthcare professionals are naturally discomforted when they are
unable to determine the medically "correct" answer and may either
avoid difficult conversations or assert greater confidence and precision
in their diagnosis or prognosis than is warranted.73 A skilled consultant/
mediator must attempt to overcome these difficulties so that the parties
can reach a common understanding of what they do or do not know."
One of the most important roles for the bioethics consultant during this
process is to help the parties share their knowledge, so that the decision
will reflect, as best as possible, the correct "facts."7 5
The consultant/mediator must also work with the lay participants to
help them sufficiently understand the medical situation. The bioethicist
should recognize the complex interrelationship between facts and val-
ues. Patients and family members often perceive the medical facts
through a scrim of their values and goals. As Dr. Cranford once noted,
for example, people's religious or moral views on when artificial nutri-
tion and hydration is appropriate may affect their willingness to accept
the healthcare professionals' presentation of the medical facts regarding
70. See Sachs & Siegler, supra note 54, at 349.
71. Newman, supra note 58, at 59; see also Ben A. Rich, Prognostication in Clinical
Medicine: Prophecy or Professional Responsibility?, 23 J. LEGAL MED. 297, 358 (2002).
72. Cf Cynthia D. Mulrow & Kathleen N. Lohr, Proof and Policy from Medical Research
Evidence, 26 HEALTH POL., POL'Y & L. 249, 249-50 (2001).
73. See KENNETH W. GOODMAN, ETHICS AND EVIDENCE-BASED MEDICINE: FALLIBILITY AND
RESPONSIBILITY IN CLINICAL SCIENCE 131 (2003) ("[i]f uncertainty is an unavoidable part of
clinical practice, then it becomes deceptive not to acknowledge" that to patients).
74. The consultant/mediator should assist the healthcare professionals to communicate
effectively and to recognize when they are not being heard or understood. In one study of
consultations, one-third of the patients or families thought that the consultation had not been
helpful in facilitating communication, while the healthcare personnel rarely perceived this as a
problem. McClung et al., supra note 50, at 456.
75. Getting the medical facts right at this stage is particularly valuable since the alternative, if
the dispute ends up in court, is having them determined by a judge, almost certainly without
medical training.
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the patient's condition.76
The role of the patient and family is not merely to hear and under-
stand what the healthcare professionals say. In determining the patient's
values and wishes, and in choosing what course to take, the patient,
proxy, and family should play the lead role, with the healthcare profes-
sionals in a supportive one.7 7 To ensure that this happens, the consultant
must be aware of the dynamics and structure of the consultation process.
The parties are differently situated in terms of their relevant knowledge,
and various structural and personal attributes give them more or less
power in this setting.78 In particular, the healthcare personnel may too
easily dominate the discussion and impose their values as to the correct
outcome. Generally, the healthcare personnel are more familiar with the
language of bioethics and medicine; they are less emotionally distraught;
they are more advantaged by class, gender, and ethnicity than patient or
family; and physicians tend to expect and receive a degree of deference
from patients and families in their interactions.7 9 Consultant/mediators
must use their training and insight to recognize and counter these
dynamics.8" They must ensure that the patient's and family's voices are
effectively heard and that deference to physicians is limited to those
issues as to which it is ethically appropriate.8
76. Ronald Cranford, Facts, Lies and Videotapes: The Permanent Vegetative State and the
Sad Case of Terri Schiavo, 33 J.L. MED. & ETHICS 363, 364 (2005) ("These witnesses who stated
that Ms. Jobes was able to respond to requests or commands were not giving false testimony under
oath. Their sincere opposition to the withholding of nutrition in any patient.., have [sic] caused
them to see signs of intelligence where no such intelligence exists." (quoting In re Jobes, 5 10 A.2d
133 (N.J. 1986)); see also Dubler, supra note 68, at 7.
77. DUBLER & LIEBMAN, supra note 33, at 28-29; Hoffmann, supra note 33, at 859; Newman,
supra note 58, at 48-49. The process described here thus differs somewhat from the consultation
process set out in LA PUMA & SCHIEDERMAYER, supra note 35, at 17. Those authors call for the
attending physician to lead the meeting among the family "since he or she is primarily responsible
for the patient's care" and seem comfortable with a form of shared decisionmaking that will
reflect, inter alia, "the doctor's personal value system." Id. at 42.
78. See generally PHYLLIS BECK KRITEK, NEGOTIATING AT AN UNEVEN TABLE: DEVELOPING
MORAL COURAGE IN RESOLVING OUR CONFLICTS (2d ed. 2002) (explicating the various ways in
which people can exercise dominance or power over others and techniques to recognize and
combat these facts); Cohen, supra note 53.
79. "The power imbalance in a hospital setting comes from many sources: the difference in
level of knowledge and expertise between most patients and the treatment team, the highly
technical and unfamiliar physical setting, and the imperfectly allied interests of the patient and the
treatment team members." Dubler & Liebman, supra note 41, at 36; see also DUBLER &
LIEBMAN, supra note 33, at 1I.
80. See, e.g., KRIrEK, supra note 78, at 36 (recognizing the untoward tendency for physician
preferences to prevail). For example, physicians may resist a process that treats family and proxy
as their equals. The mediator should acknowledge this discomfort without yielding to a dynamic
that reinforces patterns of domination and deference.
81. See Orentlicher, supra note 5, at 1282 (discussing the conflict between patient and
physician values, with the latter often dominating). LA PUMA & SCHIEDERMAYER, supra note 35,
at 18-19, correctly note that where the patient is able to articulate his or her goals, these goals -
UNIVERSITY OF MIAMI LAW REVIEW
Difficulties in ensuring a productive dialogue, in which everyone
can effectively participate, might also arise as a result of family dynam-
ics. The consultant should be able to recognize and manage interper-
sonal dynamics within a family in conflict. Sometimes those intrafamily
conflicts reflect long-standing issues. What might at first appear to be
disagreements about what should be done, or what a patient would want
done, regarding the continuance or withdrawal of medical treatment
could instead be a displacement of issues in a long-running family
drama.82 Some people never reconcile themselves to what they perceive
as the unworthy and inappropriate person their child has married. In
Schiavo, for example, by the time the case was litigated, the conflict had
permeated the entire relationship between Michael Schiavo and his in-
laws. It could be traced back at least as far as their disagreements over
the appropriate allocation of the malpractice lawsuit settlement Terri
Schiavo received in 1993.83 In such situations, the bioethicist's job is
more difficult.84 Nonetheless, he or she may be able to persuade the
family members to focus on the immediate issues of the patient's condi-
tion, wishes, and best interest, while setting aside their broader disputes.
There are also difficulties that can arise from different communica-
tive styles and personalities within the family. Some participants may
be more assertive or less concerned with ensuring that everyone is heard
and that relationships remain civil; absent a countering response by the
mediator, they may dominate the discussion.85 Other participants may
rather than any conflicting family wishes - should be implemented. In that situation, the
consultant should seek to focus the family on the patient's wishes. The consultant must also,
however, be sensitive to acknowledging his own limitations: it is not necessarily true that
consultants (or judges or mediators) will be better than the family at accurately identifying the
patient's goals. This is a particular risk where the consultant does not make a sufficient effort to
listen to the family. Cf. Fletcher & Moseley, supra note 34, at 109 (noting that in one case the
consultant dealt only with the medical personnel, not the competent patient who was seeking
withdrawal of artificial nutrition and hydration, and "strongly [took] sides in an ethics controversy
with two morally acceptable options").
82. HAFEMEISTER & HANNAFORD, supra note 31, at 86; Hoffmann, supra note 33, at 837-38;
see also George J. Annas, "Culture of Life" Politics at the Bedside - The Case of Terri Schiavo,
352 NEW ENG. J. MED. 1710, 1714 (2005) ("Decision making near the end of life . . . can
exacerbate unresolved family feuds .... ").
83. WOLFSON, supra note 8, at 9-10. One rather suspects, though nothing in the record so
states, that the money was not the only point of contention. It is impossible to reconstruct,
through the increasingly hardening positions, if there had ever been a time during this
psychodrama when the family relationships were civil enough to permit an effective bioethics
intervention.
84. The bioethicist will thus need to be particularly aware of whether some family members
are seeking to implement extraneous agendas that conflict with the patient's wishes. If so, he or
she needs to avoid decisions that may unethically resolve intrafamily conflicts at the expense of
patient autonomy.
85. LA PUMA & SCHIEDERMAYER, supra note 35, at 19. Women are more frequently
concerned with maintaining relationships and are, thus, often disadvantaged in a process where the
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disagree but be afraid to say so. The mediator must be able to distin-
guish between those who seek only to win and those who seek solutions
to conflict.86 He or she must also be aware of the emotional nature of
the issues and emotion's effect on the communication process. People
confronting a loved one's illness or death may respond with grief, with-
drawal, and anger; a whole gamut of emotions that others may perceive
as "inappropriate. 87 The consultant/mediator must recognize and seek
to overcome the desire of some healthcare or lay participants to restrict
the issues, or the language in which the issues are discussed, in ways
that silence others.88 Ideally, the process will be designed to ensure that
all the participants have, and view themselves as having, a voice in the
process. 89
To ensure that the discussion and the ensuing decision fairly reflect
the participants' voices and focus on the patient's wishes insofar as
those can be discovered, the consultant/mediator must be sensitive to his
or her role. While he or she is not a member of the healthcare team, the
consultant/mediator is chosen by, and perhaps is an employee of, the
healthcare institution. The consultant/mediator must make every effort
to be, and to be seen as, a neutral party rather than as another voice of
the institution or the medical profession. 9°
Once the participants have developed a common knowledge base
regarding the patient's condition, values, and wishes, a decision should,
ideally, be reached regarding the continuance or withdrawal of lifesav-
ing medical treatment. There is debate in the literature over what role
the consultant should play in reaching that decision. There are a variety
of possible roles, ranging from authoritarian to purely facilitative.9' At
one extreme, the consultant is authorized to determine and impose the
mediator is entirely neutral. This effectively reinforces, rather than counters, the "uneven table."
See Martha Fineman, Dominant Discourse, Professional Language, and Legal Change in Child
Custody Decisionmaking, 101 HARV. L. REV. 727, 730 (1988); Trina Grillo, The Mediation
Alternative: Process Dangers for Women, 100 YALE L.J. 1545, 1556 (1991).
86. KRrrEK, supra note 78, at 258-60.
87. Cf Grillo, supra note 85, at 1572-73 (women's anger in child custody mediations is
sometimes seen as inappropriate by mediators and the women themselves may obscure their true
feelings and desires in the attempt to persuade the mediator that they are "good people").
88. KRITEK, supra note 78, at 36-37, 216-17; Grillo, supra note 85, 1572-73.
89. Dubler, supra note 68, at 8; Wolf, supra note 28, at 856-58; cf Grillo, supra note 85, at
1550 (noting the importance of allowing people to speak in their "authentic voices").
90. ASBH, supra note 31, at 29; HAFEMEISTER & HANNAFORD, supra note 31, at 80; cf
Grillo, supra note 85, at 1587 (warning of the need for a mediator to be aware of, and to struggle
against, her own inevitable particularity).
91. ASBH, supra note 31, at 5, uses this terminology. While the text focuses on the range of
positions that scholars have advocated and ethics committees have adopted, the law may play a
role here in defihing what ethics consultants or committees may do, or at least what role would
insulate the decision from undue judicial oversight. See Annas, supra note 19, at 885 (suggesting
that courts do not fully trust families but do not want to decide for themselves). Ethics
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right outcome.9" Similar, but less extreme, is the view that the ethics
consultant should offer expert advice, which would carry a strong pre-
sumptive force.9 3 Another position would allow the ethics body to for-
mulate a recommendation, but would leave the decision in the healthcare
professionals' hands.94 At the other extreme, the consultant's role could
be entirely facilitative (i.e., to "identif[y] and analyz[e] the nature of the
value uncertainty and facilitat[e] the building of consensus" without
injecting his or her own views).95 A committee or consultant might
adopt different roles in different situations - sometimes providing a spe-
cific opinion of the most ethically correct answer, sometimes indicating
the range of ethically permissible outcomes, and sometimes facilitating
the decision by others. When committees or consultants act in this fash-
ion, it is important that they clearly distinguish which role they are tak-
ing in each particular instance. Professor Wolf raises concerns about
role confusion, both by the committee and by others, including judges,
who are influenced by what the committee does. She concludes that the
only way to avoid this risk is to require that the committee always fol-
low the same due process protective model.96 Another way to minimize
this problem would be to assign different roles to different entities: a
consultant/mediator could help the participants develop a range of ethi-
committees with fairly directive authority are one means of screening the court from ultimate
authority while not giving it to the family.
92. See Aulisio, supra note 28, at 10 (defining the "authoritarian" approach). None of the
examined sources advocated this position. See, e.g., FLA. BIOETHIcs NETWORK, supra note 28, at
18 (explicitly rejecting the idea that ethics committees should make binding decisions); see also
George J. Agich & Stuart J. Youngner, For Experts Only? Access to Hospital Ethics Committees,
HASTINGs CTR. REP., Sept.-Oct. 1991, at 17 (noting the theoretical possibilities of mandatory or
optional invocation of the consultative process and mandatory or optional acceptance of the ethics
committee's recommendation). Some bioethics committees have, however, followed a mandatory
approach, pressing for one outcome when others are ethically permissible and excluding the
patient's proxy from process. See Fletcher & Moseley, supra note 34, at 109-12 (discussing
activities of bioethicists in the Bouvia and Baby K cases).
93. See, e.g., Agich & Youngner, supra note 92, at 21 (indicating that an ethics committee's
purpose is "to assure a morally sound solution to practical conflicts, dilemmas, or problems in
clinical care"); Ruth Macklin, Consultative Roles and Responsibilities, in INSTITUTIONAL ETHICS
COMMITTEES AND HEALTH CARE DECISION MAKING, supra note 5, at 158 (suggesting that the
ethics committee's role is "to assist in efforts to arrive at morally right solutions to hard choices in
clinical decisions"). This view tends to support the position that courts should ordinarily defer to
the conclusions of an ethics committee. See Lo, supra note 56, at 46 (critiqued in Wolf, supra
note 28, at 810).
94. Unsurprisingly, this was the recommendation of the AMA. See AMERICAN MEDICAL
ASSOCIATION, GUIDELINES FOR ETHICS COMMrirEES IN HEALTH CARE INSTITUTIONS § 1 (1984)
[hereinafter AMA GUIDELINES].
95. ASBH, supra note 31, at 6; see also DUBLER & LIEBMAN, supra note 33, at 8 (defining
mediation as a "private, voluntary, informal process in which an impartial third person facilitates a
negotiation between people in conflict and helps them find solutions that meet their interests and
needs").
96. See Wolf, supra note 28, at 858.
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cally appropriate outcomes, while the bioethics committee, if asked,
could provide its own view on the ethics of a particular proposed action.
Most contemporary scholars suggest a role that is closer to the
facilitative end of the spectrum, but tempered by the authority and obli-
gation to invoke ethical and other constraints as needed.97 This reflects,
in part, the bioethical understanding that respecting patient autonomy is
a core value and that the patient, surrogate, and family are best situated
to assess what outcome best advances the patient's autonomy. It also
embodies a recognition that in most of these situations of tragic choice,
there is more than one morally acceptable outcome.
Thus, the most crucial ethical role for the consultant may be to
ensure an adequately informed and thoughtful process, rather than to
guide the parties to a particular outcome.98 The consultant/mediator
should be sensitive to the effects of religious, cultural, and ethnic identi-
ties, which may be associated with distinct views regarding end-of-life
decisionmaking.99 For example, where the patient and family have par-
ticular views on the value of life or the meaning of suffering, those
views should be taken into account even if the consultant and healthcare
personnel would not have adopted similar views for themselves. 00 Rea-
sonable minds could differ over the value of continuing the life of a
person who is severely disabled, subjected to severe incursions on his or
her dignity, and in pain that cannot be fully ameliorated by palliative
care. In such situations, it is the patient's values - as expressed by those
who knew her best - that should be followed. 1 1
The consultant/mediator's role is not, however, simply to facilitate
97. See, e.g., ASBH, supra note 31, at 6-8; DUBLER & LIEBMAN, supra note 33, at 36-37;
Jonathan Moreno, Can Ethics Consultation Be Saved?, in ETHICS CONSULTATION: FROM THEORY
TO PRACTICE, supra note 28, at 23-24.
98. While it is important not to impose a particular outcome, a good consultant/mediator can
help develop an array of acceptable outcomes and, where possible, find those which create value
rather than simply claiming value for one particular party. See KITEK, supra note 78, at 258-61;
Carrie Menkel-Meadow, Whose Dispute Is It Anyway?: A Philosophical and Democratic Defense
of Settlement (In Some Cases), 83 GEO. L.J. 2663, 2672-74 (1995).
99. Cf Haripriya M. Mannan, Death as Defined by Hinduism, 15 ST. Louis U. PUB. L. REV.
423, 425-27 (1996) (explaining Hindu views of religiously permitted self-willed death and
consequences of the death of the physical body).
100. Interview with Professor Stephen Sapp, Univ. of Miami Dep't of Religious Studies, in
Coral Gables, Fla. (Oct. 11, 2006). For a discussion on the importance of acknowledging
religion's role in shaping the views of patients and families, see Kathleen M. Boozang, An
Intimate Passing: Restoring the Role of Family and Religion in Dying, 58 U. Prrr. L. REV. 549
(1997). The consultant/mediator must be aware of his own values so he can work to avoid
imposing them. Cf Grillo, supra note 85, at 1592-93 (warning that mediators should not impose
their own view of what fairness requires but, instead, allow the parties to come to their own views
within the range of those that are legally acceptable).
101. See Wolf, supra note 28, at 839-42.
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any decision; it is to facilitate a decision that is morally acceptable.1"2
The consultant should seek to derail an unethical decision 10 3 by exercis-
ing what might be called constrained deference. Some of these con-
straints are ethical. There may also be different, though often
overlapping, constraints, based in institutional policy or law."° It is
important to recognize that the law does not require that the consultation
process' outcome be identical to one that a court could have imposed. 0 5
A decision may raise ethical warning signals if, for example, it
seems to impose substantial suffering on the patient without a clear indi-
cation that this is the patient's wish. Such warning signals may also
arise if there is reason to believe that the family members are acting
based on their own concerns, distinct from those they believe the patient
had or has. In such situations, the consultant/mediator should seek to
shift the process to one that will lead to morally acceptable outcomes.
10 6
If this cannot be done, the consultant/mediator can encourage the parties
to participate in alternative, more directive processes, and "[a]s a last
resort, involved parties may turn to the courts."'' 0 7
102. Aulisio, supra note 28, at 13.
103. Cf. Fletcher & Moseley, supra note 34, at 103-04 (consultants should provide
decisionmakers information on morally acceptable options). Even Dubler and Liebman, who
strongly advocate a largely mediative process, note that the mediator may have to shift to a more
directive role if the process appears to be "leading to an ethically unsupportable outcome."
DUBLER & LIEBMAN, supra note 33, at 13.
104. For example, if the healthcare facility has a religious identity, this may constrain the
decisions that may be implemented at that institution. The consultant should make the parties
aware of this, but should also assure them of the institution's obligation to seek to facilitate, if
needed, the transfer of the patient to an institution without such constraints. See AMA
GUIDELINES, supra note 94, § 4. The institution's attorney or risk manager has a role, distinct
from that of the bioethics consultant, in ensuring that these constraints are followed.
105. In general, even when a private decision reached by the concerned parties is subject to
court approval, that decision may embody terms that a judge could not impose. For example,
where it is impractical to provide the funds generated by a class settlement directly to the class
members, the settlement agreement can provide that the sum defendants pay will go to a fund to
benefit the class members' interests. However, a judge could not sua sponte impose such a term.
See, e.g., Eisen v. Carlisle & Jacquelin, 479 F.2d 1005, 1012 (1973), affid on other grounds, 417
U.S. 156 (1974). Similarly, the parties to a dissolution of marriage in Florida can agree that
support will be provided for the children's college education and that agreement can be
memorialized in an enforceable judgment, though the court cannot order such post-majority
support. Holmes v. Holmes, 384 So. 2d 1295, 1296 (Fla. 2d Dist. Ct. App. 1980). Hoffmann,
supra note 33, at 870, suggests that a consultant/mediator must reject a solution if it is contrary to
state law. While this is true in one sense, it is wrong insofar as it suggests that the law limits the
consensual, consultative process outcomes to those available to a court.
106. See, e.g., Aulisio, supra note 28, at 13-14 (explaining that part of the consultant's job is to
ensure that the decision reached by the family and medical personnel falls within the range of
morally acceptable options set by the guiding bioethical principles).
107. ASBH, supra note 31, at 8.
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IV. THE LITIGATION ALTERNATIVE
The consultant/mediator must recognize the consultative process'
limits. Patients with communicative capacity, close family members, or
even healthcare professionals may choose not to participate. People
may be unwilling to accept undisputed relevant facts or may legitimately
disagree about what those facts are and, thus, about what should be
done. They may have irreconcilable ethical views about the appropriate
outcome, even in light of undisputed facts. In such situations, court
intervention may be unavoidable. Note, however, that court processes
need not, and ought not, be invoked absent such a dispute. 10 8 In particu-
lar, the costs of litigation should not be endured simply because the
healthcare facility, though agreeing substantively with the proposed out-
come, seeks judicial intervention to protect itself against the possibility
of civil or criminal liability. 0 9
In Florida, family members, the healthcare facility, the attending
physician, or "any other interested person who may reasonably be
expected to be directly affected by the surrogate or proxy's decision"
can file a lawsuit to challenge such a decision.' 10 The healthcare profes-
sionals might legitimately bring a challenge if they thought the surro-
gate's decision were contrary to the patient's clear wishes, if there were
a dispute between parties with equal claim to speak for the patient,
11 1 if
there were specific reason to think the surrogate was acting with an
improper motive,1" 2 or if the treatment demanded was medically
futile. 11
3
108. This is clearly the rule in Florida, and courts in several other jurisdictions have also called
for it. See, e.g., In re Spring, 405 N.E.2d 115, 122 (Mass. 1980); In re Jobes, 529 A.2d 434, 449
(N.J. 1987); In re Nemser, 273 N.Y.S.2d 624, 631 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1966).
109. As Sachs & Siegler, supra note 54, at 353, point out, "the fears of criminal and civil
liability [for withholding treatment] are enormously out of proportion to the actual risks ....
Almost all court cases of note have involved patients and families suing for the discontinuation of
treatment, not suing because treatment was stopped inappropriately."
110. § 765.105, FLA. STAT. (2006). On any plausible interpretation, the category in quotations
in the text would not include the governor, the legislature, the president, or a non-profit
organization with an ideological agenda. These entities had a role in the Schiavo case only
because those who were statutorily authorized had chosen to bring the case to the courts.
111. Cf. In re Doe, 418 S.E.2d 3, 4 (Ga. 1992); Couture v. Couture, 549 N.E.2d 571, 572 (Ohio
Ct. App. 1989) (medical facility took the case to court for a legal determination of the correct
cause of action because patient's parents had different views of what was in the patient's best
interest).
112. John F. Kennedy Mem'l Hosp. v. Bludworth, 452 So. 2d 921, 926-27 (Fla. 1984). Since
close family will typically be the patient's chosen heirs, this cannot be sufficient to create a
cognizable conflict. But cf. Aaron N. Krupp, Health Care Surrogate Statutes: Ethics Pitfalls
Threaten the Interests of Incompetent Patients, 101 W. VA. L. REv. 99, 111-14 (1998) (suggesting
that monetary benefit from patient's death should require court intervention).
113. Ronald E. Cranford, Helga Wanglie's Ventilator, HASTINGS CTR. REP., July-Aug. 1991, at
23-24 (approvingly describing a situation where a facility sought court permission to refuse to
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The patient's family is the other major category of persons who are
specifically authorized to seek judicial intervention. Judicial interven-
tion is appropriate when there is "unresolvable disagreement among
competent adult members of the family about the correct decision." ' 4
The relevant Florida statute identifies the bases that must be stated in
such a petition." 5 Other family members may disagree with the proxy's
assessment of the patient's medical condition and prognosis; they may
believe that there is insufficient evidence that the patient wished to have
treatment withdrawn. A family conflict, however, should not be consid-
ered irresolvable until significant efforts have been made to resolve it
outside the courtroom." 16
Court intervention is also authorized (and necessary) when there is
evidence of wrongful motives or patient abuse." 7 If the participants
seem prepared to concur in a decision that raises these concerns, the
bioethics consultant can use his or her knowledge and authority to deem
such a decision as outside the ethically acceptable range; and if neces-
sary, can encourage the healthcare facility to seek judicial intervention.
Even where litigation occurs, the bioethics consultation is often
provide what they deemed futile services); see also In re Doe, 418 S.E.2d at 3, 4. Where "futility"
is simply a value judgment regarding quality of life, there is reason to question whether the
healthcare professionals should be able to challenge the surrogate or family's choice. Boozang
criticizes Cranford on this ground. See generally Boozang, supra note 100. Professor David
Orentlicher notes the confusion engendered by the use of the term "futility" both for situations in
which this is in fact a medical concept, to be determined by healthcare professionals, and those
which embody moral-political judgments about the cost of the intervention relative to the expected
limited length and quality of life. ORENTLICHER, supra note 19, at 144; see also Barbara A. Noah,
Politicizing the End of Life: Lessons from the Schiavo Controversy, 59 U. MIAMI. L. REV. 107,
128-31 (2004) (distinguishing between medical futility and ethical futility or resource allocation).
114. 1 PRESIDENT'S COMM'N FOR THE STUDY OF ETHICAL PROBLEMS IN MED. & BIOMED. &
BEHAVIORAL RESEARCH, MAKING HEALTH CARE DECISIONS 183 (1982) [hereinafter PRESIDENT'S
COMM'N, MAKING HEALTH CARE DECISIONS]. As the court in Jobes noted, "[o]f course, if there is
a dispute among the members of a patient's family, the guardian and the physicians, any interested
party can invoke judicial aid to ensure that the guidelines we have established are properly
followed and that the patient is protected." In re Jobes, 529 A.2d 434, 449 (N.J. 1987); cf. Annas,
supra note 82, at 1714 (noting that when there is disagreement among participants, "the
involvement of outside experts, including consultants, ethics committees, risk managers, lawyers,
and even courts, may become inevitable").
115. See § 765.105, FLA. STAT. (2006). These statutory bases, of course, overlap only in part
with the motivations that might lie behind the decision to invoke the judicial process.
116. See HAFEMEISTER & HANNAFORD, supra note 31, at 102-03 (resort to courts is needed
when "the parties appear to have become irrevocably deadlocked"). See generally DUBLER &
LIEBMAN, supra note 33 (promoting bioethics mediation, in part, as a means to reduce risk of
litigation).
117. John F. Kennedy Mem'l Hosp. v. Bludworth, 452 So. 2d 921, 926-27 (Fla. 1984); see
also 1 PRESIDENT'S COMM'N, MAKING HEALTH CARE DECISIONS, supra note 114, at 183 (noting
that the decision of the surrogate/family member can be challenged if there is "evidence of
physical or psychological abuse or neglect of the patient by the family, evidence of bias against
the patient's interests due to conflicting interests, or evidence that the family intends to disregard
the patient's advance directive").
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beneficial. The bioethicist's prior involvement may clarify positions,
narrow the range of dispute, and perhaps lower the temperature of the
conflict. If litigation occurs, however, the court should independently
decide the matter based on the relevant legal standards. Even where the
consultation/mediation process is as sensitive to due process as it should
be, the fact that a consultant/mediator found a particular outcome mor-
ally acceptable (or even more morally acceptable than any alternative) is
not a determination entitled to judicial deference. The consultant's role
is to decide what is ethical; the judge's role is to decide the quite distinct
issue of what is legal.1" 8
If such consultations resolve many disputes, improve the decisional
climate - even in disputes that cannot be resolved - and rarely lead to a
worse outcome than would have occurred in their absence, then it would
be reasonable to expend at least a moderate amount of resources to
increase the frequency and quality of such processes.
V. AN (UNFORTUNATELY) HYPOTHETICAL SCENARIO
We know that in the real Schiavo case, Michael Schiavo and the
Schindler family were in conflict on five distinct relevant questions.
These comprised three factual issues: (1) Was Terri Schiavo in a PVS?
(2) What was her prognosis? And, (3) what were her treatment prefer-
ences? The conflict also included one conceptual issue: (4) was her
feeding tube a medical treatment or ordinary nourishment? Finally, there
was a values question: (5) what was the value of continued life in her
then-current state?1" 9 Given these disagreements, even an advance
directive would not have avoided the ensuing dispute. We also know
that in the Schiavo case, the level of distrust, fueled to some unascertain-
able extent by the legal strangers who later became involved, ultimately
made reconciliation or even civility impossible."' 0
As Professor Dresser noted, and as this Article elaborates, "Schiavo
demonstrates the need for mediation and other dispute resolution proce-
dures to address family disagreements over life-sustaining treatment."''2
Let us imagine what might have happened if a bioethical intervention
118. See Wolf, supra note 28, at 838. Unfortunately, as Wolf notes, some courts do seem
inappropriately to defer to the outcome of a bioethics process. Id.; see also In re Spring, 405
N.E.2d 115, 122 (Mass. 1980) ("[Tlhe concurrence of qualified consultants may be highly
persuasive on issues of good faith and good medical practice."). This may be understandable
since judges are reluctant to take full responsibility for determining the outcome in such difficult
situations. See Annas, supra note 19, at 885. But to quote former President Nixon, "that would be
wrong."
119. Rebecca Dresser, Schiavo: A Hard Case Makes Questionable Law, HASTINGS CTR. REP.,
May-June 2004, at 8-9.
120. See WOLFSON, supra note 8, at 33 n.1.
121. Dresser, supra note 119, at 9.
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had been offered to the family as soon as the healthcare professionals
realized that a disagreement was developing over any of these issues and
before positions became so entrenched that hostility seemed almost a
goal rather than an undesired byproduct.
A bioethics consultant/mediator who was called in at a sufficiently
early stage might have helped the participants communicate about, and
possibly agree upon, the factual issues in dispute.122 The different posi-
tions regarding the medical questions may have stemmed from different
understandings of what a PVS is and the characteristics of someone in
such a state.'2 3 Many people doubtless found it hard to understand that a
PVS is distinct from a coma - that people in a PVS can open and close
their eyes, move their bodies, and vocalize, as Terri Schiavo did.1
2 4
Imagine how much harder it would be for a loving family member to
accept this in light of the intense desire to believe that a loved one's
condition is not hopeless and that his or her vocalizations are, at some
level, an attempt to communicate. 2 5  This is, I suggest, particularly
likely for parents to whom the helpless patient may evoke the
remembered infant whose wordless vocalizations were similarly seen as
communicative and harbingers of the infant's growing consciousness of
herself and the world around her. The consultant/mediator's knowledge
and communication skills might have helped the parents accept the bitter
fact that a PVS patient is non-sentient. Alternatively, in conjunction
122. Cf Lynne Sims-Taylor, Note & Comment, Reasoned Compassion in a More Humane
Forum: A Proposal to Use ADR to Resolve Medical Treatment Decisions, 9 OHIo ST. J. ON Disp.
RESOL. 333, 364 (1994) (suggesting that healthcare professionals who recognize that a conflict
exists within the family should invoke a process of bioethics mediation).
123. Note, however, that views on facts are not always "independent variables." The
Schindlers seem to have once agreed that Terri Schiavo was in a PVS, but shifted their ground as
hostility grew and, perhaps, as the implications of that position for their claim that artificial
nutrition and hydration be continued became clearer. See WOLFSON, supra note 8, at 33 n.1.
Under Florida law, a court can authorize withdrawal of life-sustaining treatment for someone in a
PVS, but cannot legally do so if the patient is minimally conscious or in some other severely
disabled state not specified in the statute. See § 765.404, FLA. STAT. (2006). In effect, the value
question of which kinds of conditions permit the withdrawal of treatment has been answered by
the legislature, leaving to the parties or court on this point only the factual characterization.
124. See Multi-Society Task Force on PVS, Medical Aspects of the Persistent Vegetative State,
330 NEW ENG. J. MED. 1499, 1499-1508, 1572-79 (1994) (on the characteristics of a PVS). One
of the key diagnostic tools is the inability to engage in "sustained visual pursuit." Id. at 1500.
The brief moments, highlighted on the widely distributed video clip, in which Terri's eyes
appeared to follow a balloon, did not meet this criterion. See Cranford, supra note 76, at 366.
Similarly, although it seems counterintuitive to those of us without medical training, swallowing
saliva is a reflexive behavior and can occur although the person, like Terri Schiavo, lacks the
cognitive capacity required to swallow food and water. See WOLFSON, supra note 8, at 27-28.
125. See Lori A. Roscoe, Hana Osman & William E. Haley, Implications of the Schiavo Case
for Understanding Family Caregiving Issues at the End of Life, 30 DEATH STUDIES 149, 156
(2006) (describing how family members frequently misinterpret the reflex activities of patients in
a PVS as evidence of cognition or emotional response to the observer).
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with the medical personnel, a bioethics consultant could have helped the
husband understand (if the facts had warranted) that the patient likely
had some minimal consciousness and that he might be projecting
through his own pain a belief that her condition was more dire than it
actually was.
In terms of the patient's expressed wishes, the bioethicist might
have helped the family members accept that each was, in good faith,
basing his or her views on what he or she recalled the patient as having
once said, on more general understandings of what the patient's beliefs
and views were on life and death, or on the relative importance of qual-
ity of life versus life itself. Most importantly, the consultant might have
brought them to understand that, at least in the absence of a clear, for-
mally articulated advance directive, there is frequently evidence that
points in more than one direction and that each of them may have been
reading the same congeries of fact through a different lens.
126
The consultant/mediator might have helped the family members
understand that they should try their best to understand what the patient
believed in regard to the value of continued life in her current state.
They could have agreed to disagree on their own views, without finding
the other family members' views outside the range of ethical legiti-
macy. 127 They might have agreed that the patient, who never faced the
question with the salience that all of them were now experiencing, likely
did not have as clearly or fully developed a decisional viewpoint as any
of them now did.
128
The consultant/mediator might have helped the participants under-
stand that the characterization of feeding tubes is not a factual question
about which the disagreeing family members were intransigently wrong.
Rather, it is a frame that inevitably reflects one's moral views about
what is acceptable.' 29 The consultant might also have helped the parents
126. The consultant might also have helped them understand how these lenses were the
product of their own values and histories, only partly shared by Terri Schiavo.
127. M. Gregg Bloche, Managing Conflict at the End of Life, 352 NEw ENG. J. MED. 2371,
2371 (2005). Bloche advocates a non-litigated process precisely because it encourages a
conversation about these end-of-life issues among patients, family members, and others. Id.
128. Tom Preston & Michael Kelly, A Medical Ethics Assessment of the Case of Terri Schiavo,
30 DEATH STUDIES 121, 127 (2006) ("[N]o one can be absolutely certain what Terri would have
wanted, or how much thought she gave before her injury to what would have been for her a
remote and hypothetical matter."); cf Mack v. Mack, 618 A.2d 744, 761 (Md. 1993) (McAuliffe,
J., dissenting) (noting that it would be rare for healthy young adults to have any settled, articulated
views on what should happen if they were to be in a PVS).
129. Many caregivers and members of the general public construe nutrition and hydration as a
form of basic care, like keeping the patient clean and turning her to prevent bedsores, rather than
as medical treatment. See DOLGIN & SHEPHERD, supra note 23, at 750-51; Joanne Lynn & James
F. Childress, Must Patients Always Be Given Food and Water?, HASTINGS CTR. REP., Oct. 1983,
at 17; see also JOHN KEOWN, EUTHANASIA, ETHICS AND PUBLIC POLICY 215 (2002).
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understand - without demanding that they agree with the ethical legiti-
macy of the position - that Florida law classifies artificial nutrition and
hydration as a form of medical treatment and allows withdrawal under
certain circumstances, including those that the husband was asserting
were true.
130
Of course, there is no guarantee that at the end of this process the
hypothetical family would have concurred on an outcome that all found
minimally acceptable, nor is there any guarantee what that outcome
might have been. For instance, using the Schiavo parties as an example,
the Schindlers might have agreed to permit Michael to have the feeding
tube withdrawn. Alternatively, Michael might have been persuaded to
delay doing so. They might have agreed to a waiting period or addi-
tional tests to enhance the chances of an agreement on the underlying
medical facts.' 3' Finally, the dispute might have continued unresolved
and been brought to court. Even in that situation, however, a good faith
guided communication process might have mitigated hostilities or
induced the parties to keep this a relatively private intrafamily dispute.
VI. THE PROCESS VALUES OF A NON-ADJUDICATIVE APPROACH
The use of a bioethics consultation process has many potential ben-
efits as compared to litigation. I focus at this point on the benefits; in
the next section I will examine the extent to which the use of this pro-
cess as a substitute for litigation might undermine our confidence that
the "right" substantive outcome has been reached.
First, the bioethics consultative process is better designed to be iter-
ative. The participants can reach a tentative outcome, which they can
alter in response to changes in the underlying facts, such as an unex-
pected improvement in the patient's condition in response to a new treat-
ment. While parties can return to court when facts change, the litigation
130. See also Cruzan v. Dir., Mo. Dep't of Health, 497 U.S. 261, 288-89 (1990) (O'Connor, J.,
concurring) (noting that artificial nutrition and hydration are constitutionally equivalent to medical
treatment); id. at 307-08 (Brennan, J., dissenting) (asserting that artificial nutrition and hydration
are considered medical treatment by the medical profession and the federal government). Some
state statutes, however, do not so treat it, but require greater procedural protections. See
Cerminara, supra note 18, at 171-73.
As a result of the Schiavo controversy, the Starvation and Dehydration of Persons with
Disabilities Prevention Act was introduced in the Florida Legislature. It would have distinguished
artificial nutrition and hydration from other forms of medical treatment, allowing discontinuance
for a currently non-competent patient only if she had explicitly requested this in writing. See
Cerminara, supra note 18, at 171-73. A similar bill was introduced during the 2006 session.
Although neither passed, such legislation may be reintroduced in the future. Interview with
Raquel Rodriguez, Counsel to Governor Jeb Bush, in Miami, Fla. (May 10, 2006).
131. Perhaps at this earlier stage, when there was less hostility, Jay Wolfson's proposal that the
parties agree to have Terri Schiavo undergo "swallowing tests," and the consequences that would
follow from the tests' results, might have been accepted. See WOLFSON, supra note 8, at 37.
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process - which drives the participants to take firm and sharply dichoto-
mous positions - makes this more difficult.
3 2
Second, the consultative process is less complex, less intimidating,
and less costly. As the Jobes court noted, in criticizing a requirement
that every treatment-withdrawal decision be judicially approved, "[t]he
mere prospect of a cumbersome, intrusive and expensive court proceed-
ing, during such an emotional and upsetting period in the lives of a
patient and his or her loved ones, would undoubtedly deter many per-
sons from deciding to discontinue treatment."' 33 Speed, low cost, and
simplicity are of particular value in many end-of-life situations since the
alternative is a "judicial proceeding [that] . . . may . . . prolong the
physical suffering of the patient and aggravate the distress of a family
already confronting the emotional and financial pressures of coping with
a serious illness." '134 In light of these process advantages, it seems
almost gratuitously cruel to require a judicial process when there is no
genuine dispute or substantive concern over the legitimacy of the out-
come desired by all of the parties.' 35
Third, the consultant-guided process may be better at identifying
and elucidating the range of potentially relevant facts and feelings.136 A
132. Cohen, supra note 53, at 308 ("Traditionally, litigation occurs with two parties, each on
one side of the 'v.'").
133. In re Jobes, 529 A.2d 434, 449 (1987); see also John F. Kennedy Mem'l Hosp. v.
Bludworth, 452 So. 2d 921, 925 (Fla. 1984) (warning that process to implement right to refuse
treatment "must not be so cumbersome so as to effectually eliminate it"). The Florida Supreme
Court reiterated this point in In re Guardianship of Browning, 568 So. 2d 4, 15 (Fla. 1990).
134. Mark Fowler, Note, Appointing an Agent to Make Medical Treatment Choices, 84
COLUM. L. REV. 985, 995 (1984); see also BUCHANAN & BROCK, supra note 22, at 140-41;
Stewart G. Pollack, Life and Death Decisions: Who Makes Them and by What Standards?, 41
RUTGERS L. REV. 505, 536 (1989) ("[N]o matter how expedited, judicial intervention in this
complex and sensitive area may take too long." (quoting In re Farrell, 529 A.2d 404, 415 (1987))).
135. Cf. In re Spring, 405 N.E.2d 115, 122 (Mass. 1980) (affirming trial court decision to allow
treatment withdrawal where the medical testimony indicated the patient was in great discomfort
with no significant hope of improvement and where the judge relied on "the opinion of the ward's
wife of fifty-five years [which] was corroborated by that of the son, and there was every indication
that there was a close relationship within the family group, that the wife and son had only the best
interests of the ward at heart, and that they were best informed as to his likely attitude").
136. See Menkel-Meadow, supra note 98, at 2669-70 (noting the value of non-adjudicative
processes in allowing for emotional catharsis); cf. ROBERT A. BURT, TAKING CARE OF STRANGERS:
THE RULE OF LAW IN DOCTOR-PATIENT RELATIONS 167 (1979) (stressing the need to acknowledge
the complex, painful situation in which all the participants have some responsibility for the
decision, rather than seeking to avoid responsibility by projecting the decision entirely on some
other person or entity). In a consultation/mediation, the parties can acknowledge that they are
considering congeries of facts that might be denominated as substituted judgment, best interests,
quality of life, and/or effect on others, while a court will often, in effect, obscure what is in fact
happening. See Rebecca S. Dresser & John A. Robertson, Quality of Life and Non-Treatment
Decisions for Incompetent Patients: A Critique of the Orthodox Approach, t7 L. MED. & HEALTH
CARE 234 (1989); Thomas G. Gutheil & Paul S. Appelbaum, Substituted Judgment: Best Interests
in Disguise, HASTINGS CTR. REP., June 1983, at 8-9.
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judicial hearing in which all participants seek the same outcome is
merely a choreographed formality. Where there is conflict, the evidence
is structured by each party to advance a predetermined outcome. By
contrast, in a well-run ethics consultation the participants are less likely
to be locked into conflicting positions, carefully limited to be internally
coherent. The comparative advantage of the consultant-guided process
is particularly strong where the relevant facts are unavoidably indetermi-
nate. This is frequently the case regarding the underlying medical facts.
Indeterminacy is even more likely when trying to ascertain a now-
incompetent patient's views, values, and current interests.
37
Perhaps most importantly, the goals of a bioethics consultation,
unlike litigation, include seeking consensus and reducing the hostility
level among the participants. 38  It can sometimes avoid preliminary
wrangling over who should be the proxy decisionmaker by bringing the
parties to agreement on the substantive outcome. 39 It can help create a
mutual acknowledgment that other family members have the same ulti-
mate goals of enhancing the patient's autonomy and welfare, even if
they disagree about what decision best advances those goals.
40
Consensus and lack of hostility among the family are not only valu-
137. For example, we often have no way of knowing with certainty if the responses of a
severely cognitively impaired patient indicate that she feels pain in the same way that we
understand pain, yet this might be central to a determination of the patient's wishes or best
interests. Interview with Professor Stephen Sapp, Univ. of Miami Dep't of Religious Studies, in
Coral Gables, Fla. (May 10, 2006); cf In re Conroy, 486 A.2d 1209, 1217 (N.J. 1985) (noting that
it was unclear from the evidence whether Conroy was experiencing pain). A judge may well
conclude that she has to "decide" the facts in the course of determining whether a particular
outcome is legal; a bioethics process requires that such questions be discussed, but not necessarily
answered.
138. "[S]olutions crafted by the parties to a conflict come with a sense of shared ownership
that dampens discord." Bloche, supra note 127, at 2372; see also Menkel-Meadow, supra note
98, at 2674 (non-adjudicated processes facilitate the maintenance of relationships among the
parties to a dispute).
139. The avoidance of a dispute over whether, for example, the mother or father should serve
as surrogate may itself help create such consensus. Similarly, patients can participate as much as
possible under the circumstances without any formal competency determination.
140. In a private process, it is also more likely that the parties can acknowledge that they are
facing a "tragic choice." And, by keeping the decision out of the public eye, they may avoid the
often irresolvable, destructive, public debate that we saw in Schiavo. The surrogate's
decisionmaking power, together with that of healthcare professionals and other family members,
can be seen as analogous to that of the jury, which Calabresi and Bobbitt refer to as "the
aresponsible agency" that usefully obscures tragic choices. GUIDO CALABRESI & PHILIP BOBBr-r,
TRAGIC CHOICEs 57 (1978). See generally ORENTLICHER, supra note 19, at 3 (discussing the
application of Calabresi and Bobbitt's work to end-of-life issues). Pollack, supra note 134, at 538,
makes a similar point when he suggests that the increased use of, and deference to, private
decisions facilitated by bioethics committees, can be seen as a form of judicial deregulation.
Some scholars disagree, arguing that litigation "provides the health care community and society
with an opportunity to explore publicly the issues associated with life-saving medical treatment,"
HAFEMEISTER & HANNAFORD, supra note 31, at 102.
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able to the family; these qualities of the consultative process also
enhance the welfare of patients. Part of what we seek to achieve in end-
of-life decisionmaking is to advance those values we would want recog-
nized if we were in the patient's position. Surely avoiding the kind of
internecine family battle that the Schiavo case became is one of them.
Even in the not uncommon situation where a man and his in-laws do not
get along, the wife/daughter - with loyalties and affection for all of them
- would ordinarily not want to see that relationship irreparably
damaged. 14'
Finally, if the dispute can be resolved in this alternative forum, it
will remain more private since neither the media nor outside groups will
likely have access."' 2 We could avoid the media feeding frenzy and
political rhetoric that plagued the Schiavo story. The participants in a
bioethics consultation are the healthcare professionals, the family, the
proxy, and the patient. There is no role for others, whatever ideological
interest they might have in the outcome. Based on overwhelming survey
results, we can confidently assume that Terri Schiavo would not have
wanted her tragedy to become grist for other people's agendas.,
3
VII. THE SUBSTANTIVE ACCEPTABILITY OF A
NON-ADJUDICATIVE PROCESS
The more difficult question is what the relationship is likely to be
between (1) the outcome that the participants reached collectively in
such non-adjudicative processes and (2) the outcome that would be cor-
rect under the relevant legal standard. The latter typically uses patient
autonomy as its fundamental criterion, limited only by a relatively high
burden of proof to withdraw life support (a burden presumptively met
when there is a relevant advance directive).'" Yet, at least where the
141. See Bloche, supra note 127, at 2373 (quoting the local Catholic bishop, Robert Lynch,
who said that "[tihe legacy of Terri's situation should not be that of those who love her the most
loathing the actions of one another").
142. In one case where the family and guardian chose privacy, the nursing home allowed right-
to-life advocates to enter and interview the patient. The result was a $2.58 million judgment
against the facility for invasion of privacy. See PRESIDENT'S COMM'N, DECIDING TO FOREGO,
supra note 28, at 93 n.3.
143. Schiavo is the most widely publicized, but not the first, end-of-life case in which special-
interest groups sought to hijack the judicial process, with or without the assistance of certain
family members. Cf In re Lawrance, 579 N.E.2d 32, 44 (Ind. 1991) (where healthcare facility
and family of patient in a PVS agreed to withdraw artificial nutrition and hydration, it was error
for trial court to appoint a representative of ideological groups opposed to such withdrawals as
guardian to represent the patient's interests); Gilmore v. Finn, 527 S.E.2d 426, 453, 457-58 (Va.
2000) (even after the family members resolved their dispute regarding the withdrawal of artificial
nutrition and hydration, the governor of Virginia continued to litigate (unsuccessfully) to prevent
this).
144. See In re Guardianship of Browning, 568 So. 2d 4, 13 (Fla. 1990). Where there is
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patient is incompetent to participate, as with the case of a PVS patient,
we seemingly have chosen to follow the consensus among a group of
which the patient was not a part. To what extent should that trouble us?
In some contexts, we may be concerned about non-litigated solu-
tions even where all the parties to the particular dispute fully participate,
because significant public values are implicated and may be given short
shrift by the parties.' 45 I do not believe that is the situation here. Within
the limits set by the Constitution, the larger issue of when medical care
should be withheld and death hastened is appropriate for public discus-
sion and for legislative consideration.' 46 However, the application of
those criteria to particular cases can be insulated both from these larger
ideological or political agendas and from the intervention of those with-
out knowledge of, and concern for, the individual patient.
Other, more specific considerations may caution us against
allowing the participants' consensus to dictate a decision that will, in
fact or in law, be final. Where the patient has made her'47 wishes rela-
tively clear in an advance directive, and by executing such a document
has dictated that her wishes be followed, that determination should carry
almost determinative weight, regardless of the contrary views of health-
care professionals and family members.' 48 On the other hand, where
there is no advance directive, a consensus reached by the participants
should ordinarily be conclusive.
A. Where There Is an Advance Directive
Where the patient has made a sufficiently clear and serious indica-
tion of what she wishes to happen, then the substantive value of recog-
insufficient evidence of the patient's wishes to use the autonomy criterion, the decision is to be
based on the patient's best interest. Id.
145. See Owen M. Fiss, Against Settlement, 93 YALE L.J. 1073, 1075, 1085 (1984)
(problematizing use of ADR and settlement in contexts of conflicts involving public law values).
146. Some commentators have called for a strong constitutional right to withdrawal of
treatment for both competent and incompetent patients. However, in the context of patients not
currently competent, this may be an area where the constitutional framework should generally be
designed to facilitate and enhance democratic decisionmaking rather than preempt it. See
generally STEPHEN BREYER, ACTIVE LIBERTY: INTERPRETING OUR DEMOCRATIC CONSTITUTION
(2005); JOHN HART ELY, DEMOCRACY AND DISTRUST: A THEORY OF JUDICIAL REVIEW (1980).
147. To avoid grammatical clumsiness, the patient shall be referred to hereafter as "she," a
pronoun chosen in honor of the women - Karen Ann Quinlan, Nancy Cruzan, and Terri Schiavo -
whose cases have formed the law and public attitudes about end-of-life care.
148. See Wendy E. Parmet, Terri and Katrina: A Population-Based Perspective on the
Constitutional Right to Reject Treatment 9 n.33 (May 2006) (unpublished manuscript,
Northeastern University School of Law Research Paper No. 01-2006), available at http://
ssrn.com/abstract=905873 (noting that the four dissenters and Justice O'Connor in her concurring
opinion in Cruzan v. Directior., Missouri Department of Health, 497 U.S. 261 (1990), all
"believed that a competent individual had a constitutionally-protected right to reject life-sustaining
treatment").
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nizing her autonomy and implementing her views is paramount. The
Oregon Death with Dignity Act provides a clear example. 4 9 The proce-
dures therein are well-designed to ensure that the patient is competent
and not acting out of psychological impairment. 50 Once those determi-
nations are made, the patient's wishes should be implemented. The high
value people place on autonomy and control is demonstrated by the
response to the Oregon statute: significant numbers of patients have
requested and obtained life-ending drugs and then, knowing they were
available, chosen not to use them.'
5'
Families have no independent role in this process; healthcare pro-
fessionals' only role is to ensure that protective criteria are met before
facilitating the patient's wishes. Nonetheless, some are concerned that
the patient's expressed wishes may inappropriately incorporate pressure
by family members or healthcare professionals, actual or perceived, to
end her life prematurely and reduce the family's suffering or the drain
on medical resources. 5 2 Such concerns are not entirely frivolous but, if
accepted, would undermine the concepts of consent and autonomy them-
selves - a path inherently in conflict with the bases of both bioethics and
American jurisprudence.' 53
149. OR. REV. STAT. §§ 127.800-127.897 (2006). Although the Supreme Court rejected the
claim that there was a constitutional right to physician-assisted suicide in Washington v.
Glucksberg, 521 U.S. 702, 735 (1997), it also rejected the attempt of Attorney General Gonzales
to derail the Oregon system through a rule that would have held that physicians who provided
drugs to patients pursuant to the Act violated the Federal Controlled Substances Act. See
Gonzales v. Oregon, 126 S. Ct. 904, 913-14, 925 (2006).
150. See Gonzales, 126 S. Ct. at 912.
151. See, for example, KATRINA HEDBERG, OREGON'S DEATH WITH DIGNITY ACT: THREE
YEARS OF LEGALIZED PHYsICIiAN-AssISTED SUICIDE 9 (2001), which reports that one-third of the
recipients died from causes other than use of the drugs (cited in Brief for the Patient-Respondents
at 36-37, Gonzales v. Oregon, 126 S. Ct. 904 (2006) (No. 04-623), 2005 WL 1749169).
152. These concerns have been raised within American legal scholarship as early as 1958 - see
Yale Kamisar, Some Non-Religious Views Against Proposed "Mercy-Killing" Legislation, 42
MINN. L. REV. 969, 990-93 (1958) - and were one of the factors that led the Supreme Court to
reject a constitutional right to die. See Washington v. Glucksberg, 521 U.S. 702, 752-760 (1997)
(Souter, J., concurring). However, recent research, made possible by the Oregon experiment,
suggests little reason for concern. The patients choosing physician-assisted suicide generally are
better educated, and all have some form of health insurance. There is no evidence that pressure
from others was a "primary motivating influence." Brief for the Patient-Respondents, supra note
151, at 36; see also L. Ganzini & S. K. Dobscha, Clarifying Distinctions Between Contemplating
and Completing Physician-Assisted Suicide, 15 J. CLINICAL ETHICS 119, 121 (2004) (concluding
that "these data do not support a slippery slope of increasing death-hastening acts").
153. The presumption of free will/autonomy is perhaps clearest in criminal law since
punishment necessarily rests on a belief that the wrongdoer can be blamed for his harmful acts.
See Sanford H. Kadish, Complicity, Cause and Blame: A Study in the Interpretation of Doctrine,
73 CAL. L. REV. 323, 326 (1985). Compare the outcry over Catherine MacKinnon's view that
women lack sufficient free will under contemporary conditions to give free consent to sexual
activities in, for example, CATHARINE A. MACKINNON, FEMINISM UNMODIFIED: DISCOURSES ON
LIFE AND LAW (1987), and discussions of MacKinnon's work in, for example, Lucinda M. Finley,
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Substantially greater concerns regarding the reality of autonomy
could be raised in the case of a no-longer-competent patient where life-
preserving treatment is withheld in accordance with previously
expressed wishes in a living will or via a chosen healthcare surrogate.
Even if we knew with absolute certainty what the patient, when compe-
tent, wanted to happen in the particular situation she now faces, there is
the conceptual problem that the patient is no longer that person. The
medical condition has changed both her capacities and her needs, and it
may also have changed her desires. 154 This is not an insignificant prob-
lem. Advocates for the disabled note that studies seem to suggest that
persons with quite limited cognitive and physical capacity to control or
even interact with their environment find significant subjective pleasure
in those activities and experiences that remain open to them. 55 Should
someone in that situation be denied life-preserving treatment because
she, when still without such impairments, clearly indicated that she
"would not want to live that way"?
I find this problem poignant and painful, though unlike some other
scholars'5 6 I ultimately conclude that implementing the autonomous
wishes of the then-competent patient, rather than her current best interest
(presumably as assessed by physician and family) is the proper
course. 157 Most of us who write and think about these issues are intel-
The Nature of Domination and the Nature of Women: Reflections on Feminism Unmodified, 82
Nw. U. L. REV. 352 (1988), Patricia A. Cain, Feminism and the Limits of Equality, 24 GA. L. REV.
803 (1990), and Jeanne L. Schroeder, Abduction from the Seraglio: Feminist Methodologies and
the Logic of Imagination, 70 TEX. L. REv. 109 (1991).
154. Dresser, supra note 47, at 1823, 1833-37; see also RONALD DWORKIN, LIFE'S DOMINION:
AN ARGUMENT ABOUT ABORTION, EUTHANASIA, AND INDIVIDUAL FREEDOM 199-237 (1993).
155. There "is some empirical evidence that healthy patients underestimate the quality of life
that comes with having a disabling condition." Orentlicher, supra note 5, at 1294.
156. ALAN JACQUES & GRAHAM A. JACKSON, UNDERSTANDING DEMENTIA 286 (3d ed. 2000);
Dresser & Robertson, supra note 136, at 234.
157. See JACQUES & JACKSON, supra note 156, at 287-300. If we were to conduct a best
interest test here, the medical personnel would play a large role since the kinds of knowledge that
the family possesses would be less significant than in a substituted-judgment situation. By
definition, we are not seeking to implement the person's previously expressed wishes, and there is
no reason to impute to the severely cognitively impaired any current concern regarding the effect
of their treatment on the lives of other family members except insofar as it might affect the
caretaking or emotional support for the patient herself.
Agnieszka Jaworska, Respecting the Margins of Agency: Alzheimer's Patients and the
Capacity to Value, 28 PHIL. & PUB. AFF. 105 (1999), persuasively argues that many persons with
significant loss of cognitive capacity nonetheless retain some of the critical interests they
previously had. They value certain activities and ways of being, not merely for their immediate
experiential pleasure but because they express people's sense of who they are - in other words,
their values and not merely their desires. Insofar as that is true, the person retains some capacity
for autonomy, and our respect for autonomy requires us to "take seriously his current wishes."
This would raise serious issues for a position that would permit withdrawal of lifesaving medical
treatment because the person, in his current position, lacks sufficient "meaning and purpose in
[his] life," even absent an advance directive. Newman, supra note 58, at 41. It is less problematic
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lectuals. For us generally and for me specifically, cognitive capacities
are central to self. I can imagine myself living a satisfactory, if more
circumscribed life even with very substantial limits on my physical
capacities and comfort. I can, at some level, identify with Helen Keller
or Steven Hawking and see their lives as ones I could live with satisfac-
tion. But, I have repeatedly said, and fully believe, that I absolutely do
not want to live with advanced Alzheimer's. I remember my mother,
who spent her last few years in the Alzheimer's unit of a nursing home,
and have asked my children to do everything legally possible, and more
if they can do so without legal risk to themselves, to end my existence
before I reach that stage. In part, I suppose, I lack the moral imagination
to see myself as a person enjoying a life whose highlights consist of the
taste of ice cream a nurse's aide spoons into my mouth and the feel of a
blanket my fingers compulsively caress.
Nonetheless, I think this disjuncture between the experiential lives
of the severely cognitively disabled and their prior non-disabled selves is
an insufficient reason not to follow the clearly expressed and relevant
wishes of the earlier self.158 A commitment to autonomy, including the
ability to bind ourselves now to something in the future, like Ulysses at
the wheel, is one of the significant strands of our jurisprudence. 159 And,
for my view, which would privilege the person's pior wishes in an advance directive, insofar as
we ensure that patients, if they retain some communicative capacity, be part of the dialogue over
medical care choices and that their current views then be "taken seriously." See In re Martin, 538
N.W.2d 399, 413 (Mich. 1995) (refusing to apply rules of deference to determinations of treating
physician, hospital ethics committee, and guardian to withdraw lifesaving treatment where patient
retained some ability to communicate); Conservatorship of Wendland v. Wendland, 28 P.3d 151
(Cal. 2001) (same). Even Jaworska, who focuses on persons who still have some significant
cognitive capacities and ability to communicate their wishes, concludes that family and caretakers
need not necessarily defer to the person's current wishes if they are internally inconsistent or
conflict with prior autonomous choices because of defects in current reasoning capacity.
Jaworska, supra, at 137-38.
158. It is also worth noting that in a study of older Americans, those with more serious health
conditions were more willing to accept treatments despite the risk of pain or significant physical
disability post-treatment. However, a large percentage of all respondents would reject treatment
likely to lead to an outcome of severe cognitive disability. Terri R. Fried et al., Prospective Study
of Health Status Preferences and Changes in Preferences over Time in Older Adults, ARCHIVES
INTERNAL MED., Apr. 24, 2006, at 890.
159. While some contract scholars see autonomy as the dominant value, see, for example,
CHARLES FRIED, CONTRACT AS PROMISE: A THEORY OF CONTRACTUAL OBLIGATION (1981), others
stress the importance of competing values such as community, see, for example, GRANT GILMORE,
THE DEATH OF CONTRACT (Ronald K.L. Collins ed., 1974), and Duncan Kennedy, Form and
Substance in Private Law Adjudication, 89 HARV. L. REV. 1685, 1733 (1976). In the particular
context of end-of-life decisionmaking, I suggest that autonomy is appropriately privileged where
the patient has made her wishes clear, while values of community are of greater significance in the
absence of advance directives.
Dresser's rejection of autonomy on the view that the earlier, competent person is so different
that she has no ethical claim to bind the later, incompetent person is rejected by BUCHANAN &
BROCK, supra note 22, at 157-59, who argue that the later self is either sufficiently similar or, in
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without disrespecting the interests of the disabled, I believe the concerns
of the earlier, competent person, reflecting a carefully considered deter-
mination, should trump the possibly divergent views of the person who
is no longer competent (at least when that current person's medical con-
dition is as severe as is necessary to trigger current law regarding with-
drawal of artificial nutrition and hydration for a non-competent
patient). '
60
Nevertheless, this still leaves the question of whether and when a
living will or the appointment of a healthcare surrogate provides us with
sufficient certainty regarding what this person would want to happen
when the triggering condition later arises. Unfortunately, we are typi-
cally far less certain than we might wish.
First, a living will is an imperfect instrument because it is essen-
tially impossible to anticipate the many and various conditions and prog-
noses that may be in our future and to indicate with precision and clarity
what medical responses we might want for each. 161 Consider the diffi-
culties of informed consent generally. Even with a trained professional
guiding the discussion and choices, structured by an existing medical
condition and a relatively limited set of treatment options, it is not
always possible to adequately predict the possible outcomes so that the
patient may, with full knowledge, choose a course of action. 162 As Jay
Katz noted, the tension between our visions of articulated informed con-
sent, implementing patient control and based on full disclosure, on the
one hand, and all the legal, medical, and human realities that constrain
such decisionmaking on the other, "is the central problem of informed
consent."' 163 In the context of advance directives, the possible situations
to which the document might apply are far greater, and the prognoses
the case of extreme cognitive incapacity, so radically different that it should not be denominated a
self at all.
160. Under section 765.302, Florida Statutes, and section 765.306, Florida Statutes, the patient
must be terminal, in an end-stage condition, or in a PVS. See also BUCHANAN & BROCK, supra
note 22, at 109 (arguing for strong deference to the performative act of an advance directive,
particularly since "[almong the candidates for preeminent objective goods, self-determination and
a life of conscious purposeful activity or at the very least one in which pleasures outweigh pains
and disabilities are much more plausible than biological life as such").
I do not reach in this Article the more difficult question of when substituted judgment, based
on relevant choices in an advance directive, might be used to refuse life-sustaining treatment for a
patient, such as one who had suffered a severe stroke, who is incapable of participating in care
decisions yet retains some cognitive capacity and is not in a terminal condition.
161. Angela Fagerlin & Carl E. Schneider, Enough: The Failure of the Living Will, HASriNGS
CTR. REP., Mar.-Apr. 2004, at 30.
162. Cf Judith H. Hibbard et al., Informing Consumer Decisions in Health Care: Implications
from Decision-Making Research, MILBANK Q., Sept. 1997, at 395 (noting limits on human
capacity to process complex arrays of information).
163. Jay Katz, Informed Consent - A Fairy Tale? Law's Vision, 39 U. Prrr. L. REV. 137, 139
(1977).
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and treatment options harder to imagine, given the near certainty of
changes in medical knowledge and practices over time. 164 For example,
the concepts and boundaries of PVS and coma have changed over time;
by the time my younger colleagues' advance directives come into play,
the set of categories and their boundaries will likely be different than
they are today.
In fact, most people who use living wills work from one of a small
number of forms provided by non-profit or professional organiza-
tions. 65 These necessarily paint with a broad brush. Some interpreta-
tion is frequently needed to apply the terms of a living will to a situation
that fits only imperfectly into the language of the form the patient found,
read, and signed. If people try to avoid this with an individualized docu-
ment, they may still fail to anticipate the specific situation in which they
eventually find themselves. 166 Any document will become misleading if
people's preferences change, but they may neglect to update the advance
directive. Moreover, the document may be unavailable at the time it is
needed, or worse yet, it might not even be followed.
1 67
164. See, e.g., BUCHANAN & BROCK, supra note 22, at 104-07; Dresser, supra note 47, at 1830-
3 1; Orentlicher, supra note 5, at 1294; cf. Hibbard et al., supra note 162, at 400 (noting that a
"person in good health cannot always foresee what his or her needs or values might be during an
illness").
This is a problem in part because some healthcare professionals and courts insist on a greater
degree of specificity in advance directives than those who execute them desire. Nikki Ayers
Hawkins et al., Micromanaging Death: Process Preferences, Values, and Goals in End-of-Life
Medical Decision Making, 45 GERONTOLOGIST 107, 108 (2005).
When an advance directive is executed close to the time when it will become operative, such
as one done at the relevant hospital admission pursuant to the information provided under the
Patient Self-Determination Act of 1990, 42 U.S.C. § 1395cc(f) (2007), these problems are
lessened. Of course, this will not apply in a Schiavo-like situation where the patient is
unconscious before the hospital admission or even when the patient's cognitive capacities are
substantially reduced by the triggering event, such as a stroke.
165. Some of the organizations and the Web sites from which such documents can be obtained
are: (1) the Florida Attorney General (see Fla. Bar & Fla. Med. Ass'n, Suggested Form of a Living
Will, Florida Statutes Section 765.303, http://www.myfloridalegal.com/LivingWill.pdf (last
visited Apr. 2, 2007)); (2) Caring Connections (see Advance Directives - Download - Caring
Connections, http://www.caringinfo.org/i4a/pages/Index.cfm?pageid=3425 (last visited Apr. 2,
2007)); and (3) the American Bar Association (see AARP, AM. BAR Ass'N COMM'N ON LEGAL
PROBLEMS OF THE ELDERLY & AM. MED. Ass'N, SHAPE YOUR HEALTHCARE FUTURE WITH
HEALTH CARE ADVANCE DIRECTIVES (1995), available at http://www.abanet.org/lawinfo/adb.pdf).
166. After discussing all these problems with living wills as currently executed, Pope indirectly
undermines the possibility of fully eliminating them by proposing that advance care planning be
done in the doctor's office over several visits and "include family, friends, clergy, or lawyers in
the discussion" - a staggeringly impractical proposal for all but a tiny percentage of the cases
where some kind of advance directive is desirable. See Thaddeus Mason Pope, The
Maladaptation of Miranda to Advance Directives: A Critique of the Implementation of the Patient
Self-Determination Act, 9 HEALTH MATRIX 139, 153 (1999). A similarly idealistic, impractical
vision of the advance directive process can be seen in Douglas K. Martin, Linda L. Emanuel &
Peter A. Singer, Planning for the End of Life, 356 LANCET 1672 (2000).
167. Fagerlin & Schneider, supra note 161, at 33-36; Kenneth W. Goodman, Persistent
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These problems can be avoided by the use of a healthcare surro-
gate, rather than a living will.' 68 The patient will choose someone she
knows and trusts to understand her views on the issues of end-of-life
care. 169  The patient will, one hopes, have discussed those views in
detail with the surrogate before or after choosing him for that role. 7 °
The surrogate will know the patient's history and her philosophy of life
well enough to fill in the interstices of those specific conversations and
instructions. The surrogate will be available at the time the healthcare
situation arises. The healthcare professionals can communicate the
actual situation, prognosis, and treatment options to the surrogate, just as
they would have to the patient herself if she were still competent. The
surrogate can then choose what the patient would have wished.
Unfortunately, studies of healthcare surrogates tend to undermine
this rosy picture. A number of studies have examined potential patients
and the people they had chosen as a surrogate, the people they said they
would choose, or the relatives (most typically spouses or adult children)
whom, experience indicates, people in particular family constellations
generally choose (the "putative surrogate"). t ' The potential patient and
the putative surrogate were presented with the same scenario and asked
to indicate the healthcare option they would choose for the potential
patient. In comparing the choices people made for themselves and those
of their surrogates, they agreed between sixty and seventy percent of the
time, a better correlation than between people and their physicians, but
less than the potential patients had predicted. 72 Not infrequently, the
Legislative State: Law, Education, and the Well-Intentioned Healthcare Ethics Committee, 13
HEC F. 32, 37 (2001) (some healthcare facilities are inappropriately reluctant to follow non-
standard living wills); Joanne Lynn, Why I Don't Have a Living Will, 19 MED. & HEALTH CARE
101, 101-04 (1991).
168. The problem of patient's choice being ignored can still arise. Deference to the choice of a
patient-selected surrogate was not always even seen as appropriate. Cf 1 PRESIDENT'S COMM'N,
MAKING HEALTH CARE DECISIONS, supra note 114, at 164 (promoting surrogate decisionmaking,
but then asserting that healthcare professionals should be able to challenge the surrogate's choice
"on the ground that it is not based on the patient's best interests or on a reasonable interpretation
of the patient's instructions").
169. 2 PRESIDENT'S COMM'N, MAKING HEALTH CARE DECISIONS, supra note 114, at 240
(indicating that patients are likely to select a family member as their surrogate).
170. Having used "she" for the patient, I use masculine pronouns - "he," "him," etc. - for the
surrogate to avoid confusion.
171. Dallas M. High and Howard B. Turner indicate that patients want to have a spouse or an
adult child serve as surrogate, but do not want to execute advance directives unless they do not
have such close relatives available to speak for them. Dallas M. High & Howard B. Turner,
Surrogate Decision-Making: The Elderly's Familial Expectations, 8 THEORETICAL MED. 303, 307
(1987). See generally Ezekiel J. Emanuel & Linda L. Emanuel, Proxy Decision Making for
Incompetent Patients: An Ethical & Empirical Analysis, 267 JAMA 2067 (1992).
172. Jan Hare, Clara Pratt & Carrie Nelson, Agreement Between Patients and Their Self-
Selected Surrogates on Difficult Medical Decisions, 152 ARCHIVES INTERNAL MED. 1049 (1992);
Allison B. Seckler et al., Substituted Judgment: How Accurate Are Proxy Predictions?, 115
(Vol. 61:539
SCHIAVO: THE ROAD NOT TAKEN
surrogate will choose to withdraw medical treatment when the patient
would have wanted it to continue or vice versa. 73  One study asked
participants the reasons for their decision: surrogates were more likely
to list the patient's pain level as crucial, and patients were more likely to
consider the burden on their families and the time left to live. 7" In the
real world, such disagreements, or even a conflict of interest that fosters
doubt regarding the surrogate's capacity to know and choose consistent
with the patient's wishes, are unlikely to be discovered, since "the range
of acceptable practices is so broad that the absence of explicit statements
of patients' preferences makes it difficult to discern such conflicts."'
' 75
This would be troubling if patients expect the surrogate to channel
the patient's own wishes. However, one study suggested that a "major-
ity ... of terminally ill patients would select their surrogate's treatment
decision rather than the treatment outlined in their own advance direc-
tives."'176 Patients' stated reasons included trust in the surrogate's judg-
ment and concern for the surrogate's own interests.
Despite the predictable gaps between what the decision would be if
the decisionmaker could know with certainty what the patient wants and
the decision embodied in a living will or made by a designated proxy, it
still seems likely that following the latter significantly - though imper-
fectly - enhances patient autonomy.177 Where the patient has explicitly
ANNALS INTERNAL MED. 92 (1991). Professor Doukas proposes that people and their chosen
surrogates engage in a complex process of detailed discussion leading to a guidance document he
denominates a "family covenant." David John Doukas, "Family" in Advance Care Planning: The
Family Covenant in the Wake of Terri Schiavo, 33 J.L. MED. & ETHICS 372 (2005). This idea is, I
believe, as impractical as Pope's analogous effort to reform the process for living wills. See Pope,
supra note 166, at 153.
173. Rebecca S. Allen & John L. Shuster, The Role of Proxies in Treatment Decisions, 20
BEHAV. Sci. & L. 235, 241 (2002) (the best predictor of the proxy's choice is what he would
choose for himself); William E. Haley et al., Family Issues in End-of-Life Decision Making and
End-of-Life Care, 46 AM. BEHAV. Sci. 284 (2002); Orentlicher, supra note 5, at 1268-69 (citing
various studies and concluding that there is evidence both that surrogates underpredict and
overpredict the patient's desired level of care).
174. Hare, supra note 172, at 1051, 1053.
175. Emanuel & Emanuel, supra note 171, at 2068.
176. Haley, supra note 173, at 290; see also Christina M. Puchalski et al., Patients Who Want
Their Family and Physician to Make Resuscitation Decisions for Them: Observations from
SUPPORT and HELP, 48 J. AM. GERIATRICS Soc'y S84 (2000) (most older Americans studied
preferred to let their family member or physician decide whether to issue a do-not-resuscitate
order, rather than being bound by their own previously stated preference, particularly if they had
chosen the family member as their surrogate); Peter B. Terry et al., End-of-Life Decision Making:
When Patients and Surrogates Disagree, 10 J. CLINICAL ETHICS 286, 288-89 (1999) (seriously ill
patients preferred to have their surrogate's treatment choice followed rather than their own
advance directive, especially where the patient chose the surrogate).
177. In Cruzan v. Director, Missouri Department of Health, 497 U.S. 261, 289 (1990), Justice
O'Connor indicated in her concurrence that courts should grant greater deference to a chosen
surrogate's decision than that of a legally designated substitute. Even Chief Justice Rehnquist
suggested that the constitutional issue might have been decided differently if there were sufficient
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sought to make her wishes clear, autonomy values are central and dis-
place conflicting values of intrafamily harmony or other interests extrin-
sic to the patient's autonomy. Part of family values is the recognition
that the interests of certain family members, such as those who are
extremely ill, may trump the conflicting values of other family mem-
bers. 78 While we can and should work to improve advance directives'
availability, accuracy, and completeness, this objective is not inconsis-
tent with implementing, as best we can, the wishes embodied in
whatever documentation exists. 7 9
We should acknowledge that this rule of high deference is designed
to make people, while competent, feel comfortable that they have the
authority to make these decisions for themselves and to know that their
wishes will govern what happens to them when they are no longer com-
petent.'8 0 That comfort is provided by following the living will or the
surrogate's directives, which are the best evidence we have of the
patient's wishes when competent. Perhaps we should take some comfort
from the fact that most people who use living wills are unaware of the
research described above and thus probably believe that their wishes are
clear and will be followed. Meanwhile, those who choose surrogates
may recognize (and even want) the surrogate to take the whole context
into account or may seek to turn decisionmaking responsibility over to
the surrogate, although such attitudes do not fit easily within a simplistic
vision of "patient autonomy." The patient's autonomous choice may be,
in a sense, to "choose in accordance with the surrogate's view of the
patient's best interests, rather than the surrogate's view of the patient's
preferences." 18 1
Even in this situation, while the patient's choice to have treatment
withdrawn should be determinative, there should be some limited flexi-
evidence that the patient had chosen to have the decision made for her by a surrogate she had
selected. Id. at 287 n.12. See generally DOLGIN & SHEPHERD, supra note 23, at 743-49,
178. But cf John Hardwig, What About the Family? (Patient Autonomy, Medical Ethics and
the Family), HASTINGS CTR. REP., Mar.-Apr. 1990, at 6 ("[T]he seriously ill may have a right to
special consideration, and the family of an ill person may have a duty to make sacrifices to
respond to a member's illness .... [But] there are limits to the right to special treatment by virtue
of illness.").
179. See generally Allen & Shuster, supra note 173, in which the authors summarize the
literature demonstrating limitations in the current advance planning processes, but conclude that
the response should be new modalities to improve those processes and make them more
effectively available to a broader range of people.
180. See BUCHANAN & BROCK, supra note 22, at 154 (arguing that "law and medical practice
ought to regard valid advance directives as having nearly the same force as a competent patient's
contemporaneous choice, because attempts to limit the authority of advance directives would in
practice lead to their being ignored by paternalistic physicians or families, thus robbing them of
their value").
181. Orentlicher, supra note 5, at 1280; see infra notes 191-208 and accompanying text.
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bility at the margins. When we are reasonably certain that a family
member or members have a long-term, intimate, and loving relationship
with the patient, their concerns should not always be entirely irrelevant
unless the family member can recast them as expressing the patient's
own, autonomous wishes. A loving spouse or adult child who has long
been the patient's caretaker may have difficulty accepting that the
patient's condition is terminal or that no further treatment can provide
the patient a quality of life sufficient to meet her formerly expressed
minimum expectations. Assume that the patient's express prior state-
ments are silent regarding her wishes to consider the impact on the fam-
ily member, but that all the evidence about their relationship and our
knowledge of how most people live their lives embedded in a web of
care and concern would suggest that the patient would want that family
member's concerns to be taken into account. It does not seem to intrude
unnecessarily upon patients' autonomy to delay the withdrawal of treat-
ment for a limited period of time to allow family members to reconcile
themselves to the situation and to let go.'
82
B. In the Absence of an Advance Directive
A different analysis is called for when the decision to seek treat-
ment withdrawal is made by a proxy selected by a legal default rule
rather than by the patient herself. In this case, the proxy's assertion that
his request is merely implementing the patient's wishes lacks the indicia
of reliability or serious consideration inherent in an advance directive
situation. In turn, we have less reason to think that a judge, following
the proxy's recommendation, will reflect the patient's choice, and thus
further "patient autonomy." This weakness is compounded by the
nature of court processes, which are an imperfect instrument to deter-
mine the patient's wishes. They are less capable than a consultant-
guided discussion of taking into account a rich understanding of what a
patient would want, including the impact of the choice on the family.' 83
Studies suggest that a more nuanced view of patient autonomy than
courts can readily acknowledge is more likely to lead to an outcome
182. See Lois Shepherd, Shattering the Neutral Surrogate Myth in End-of-Life
Decisionmaking: Terri Schiavo and Her Family, 35 CUMB. L. REV. 575, 585-88 (2004)
(criticizing the decision of the court in Hanford Pinette's case to enforce his living will and end
lifesaving medical treatment without any accommodation for the concerns of his wife of fifty-
three years). Similarly, in an end-of-life situation for a child with an extremely poor prognosis,
the most ethical, legally permissible outcome would permit parents who had chosen not to
continue care a reasonable period to process the situation before the decision to remove life-
sustaining medical treatment is implemented.
183. While it is possible that this patient, though not having executed a living will or proxy
designation, did not want the concerns of her family considered, a bioethics consultant is as well
situated as a judge to elicit any evidence of this.
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consistent with what people usually want in this kind of situation.' 84
I have already described the potential disjuncture between what the
patient had earlier indicated she would later want and what she actually
would want now. This problem is far more severe in the absence of an
advance directive. The court may lack effective access to relevant infor-
mation regarding what the patient wants, as this is often hard to articu-
late in the formal categories required by the rules of evidence and the
relevant substantive legal categories. Professor Jecker has argued con-
vincingly that the law's demand for cognizable evidence, especially
when it is combined with a requirement that the evidence be clear and
convincing, "effectively dismantles any effort to locate remnants of
patients' values through intimate contacts and piece them into meaning-
ful patterns."' 85
When the evidence consists of specific statements that the patient is
claimed to have made, there may be reasons to doubt its reliability.
Consider the evidence in Schiavo itself. The husband produced his own
testimony and that of members of his family that - in the context of the
terminal illnesses of Terri Schiavo's grandmother and grandmother-in-
law and a television movie about an end-of-life situation - Terri Schiavo
had stated that she would not want to live like that. 86 Her parents
believed that their daughter's views were different and that, like them,
she would have followed Catholic doctrine and refused the withdrawal
184. In addition, since we are less certain of the patient's wishes absent an advance directive it
may be appropriate to give greater weight to her current best interest. See BUCHANAN & BROCK,
supra note 22, at 119-20.
185. Nancy S. Jecker, The Role of Intimate Others in Medical Decision Making, 30
GERONTOLOGIST 65, 67 (1990); see also Nancy K. Rhoden, Litigating Life and Death, 102 HARV.
L. REv. 375, 377 (1988) (noting that families' judgments of what patients would want are often
"highly intuitive - based on love and intimacy, not specific statements or actions"). Justice
Brennan, dissenting in Cruzan, stressed the value of testimony from the family that the Missouri
court had discounted because it was not a reporting of specific statements Nancy Cruzan had
made, but the family's assessment based on their general knowledge of their daughter or sister
regarding what she would have wanted. See Cruzan v. Dir., Mo. Dep't of Health, 497 U.S. 261,
322 (1990) (Brennan, J., dissenting) ("[T]hey were certain that Nancy would want to discontinue
artificial nutrition and hydration. ... ). While there are good reasons to allow such intuitive
knowledge into the decisionmaking process, there are at least equally compelling reasons to forbid
its introduction, or court reliance upon it, in the law in general. See, e.g., Florida v. Rodriguez,
469 U.S. 1, 5 (1984) (per curiam) (stating that the Fourth Amendment requires that police have
reasonable, articulable suspicion, not merely intuitions based on their experience, to permit a
frisk); Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1, 21-22 (1968).
186. See In re Guardianship of Schiavo, No. 90-2908GD-003, 2000 WL 34546715, at *6 (Fla.
6th Cir. Ct. Feb. 11, 2000); ScmAvo wrTH HIRSH, supra note 13, at 139, 145, 159. Some of the
testimony would cover the situation in which Terri Schiavo found herself, but was likely not
intended to be taken to its literal conclusion. For example, her husband said she would not have
wanted to live in a way that would "be a burden to anybody," but surely she was not calling for
the withdrawal of any lifesaving treatment if she were permanently wheelchair-bound. Id.
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of artificial nutrition and hydration. 18 7 The judge's decision concerning
the patient's beliefs necessarily relied upon hearsay, a form of evidence
we frequently are hesitant to fully credit. 88 Not atypically, the state-
ments may have been offhand or evoked by particular emotional situa-
tions. We know how polls can be manipulated; should it matter what the
television movie's embedded viewpoint was? Further, even more than
in the situation of construing a living will, we must extrapolate com-
ments such as these, evoked by particular and often readily distinguisha-
ble factual situations, to Terri Schiavo's wishes in regard to her actual
condition and the specific issue whether artificial nutrition and hydration
should be withdrawn.' 89 Even if each witness testified to what he or she
honestly remembered the patient as having said, and even if each wit-
ness's testimony was fully consistent with what the witness believed the
patient wanted, the witnesses are likely (as they were here) to be family
members or close friends whose perceptions and memories are likely
colored by their own beliefs about what they want for the patient and,
thus, believe the patient must have wanted for herself. 90
We do know that Judge Greer believed the husband's witnesses and
found he had shown by clear and convincing evidence that Terri Schiavo
would have wanted the feeding tube withdrawn.' 9' But this is a situa-
tion where evidence is frequently less than clear. And it is difficult for
the judge, like the witnesses, to put aside personal values or beliefs
187. See SCHINDLER ET AL., supra note 15, at 183 (describing Terri as "a devout and pious
Catholic"); id. at 70-72 (noting that Terri had been upset that Karen Ann Quinlan was taken off
life support).
188. In Cruzan, Chief Justice Rehnquist noted the analogy of withdrawal of lifesaving medical
treatment to situations such as the appropriate distribution of the deceased's estate in which we
often refuse to admit such oral testimony at all. Cruzan, 497 U.S. at 284.
189. Cf. In re Martin, 538 N.W.2d 399, 411 (Mich. 1995) (rejecting argument for treatment
withdrawal because the patient "is not suffering from the type of incapacitation referenced in his
expression of a desire not to continue life-sustaining medical treatment"). More generally, the
Conroy court indicated that in assessing claims of what the patient said she wanted, the court
should consider the claims' "probative value [which] ... may vary depending.on the remoteness,
consistency, and thoughtfulness of the prior statements or actions and the maturity of the person at
the time." In re Conroy, 486 A.2d 1209, 1230 (N.J. 1985). One might draw an analogy between
(1) the difference between using an advance directive and oral statements such as Terri's and (2)
the difference between applying a rule from a statute that may not have anticipated the precise
situation and finding a rule from scattered dicta in cases with different facts.
190. It is apparent that Michael's brother and sister-in-law supported the withdrawal of
treatment; even if their reporting was entirely accurate, Terri may have been agreeing with them
rather than articulating her own, independently developed views.
191. "[W]e cannot gainsay the findings of the court" though "no one can be absolutely certain
what Terri would have wanted, or how much thought she gave before her injury to what would
have been for her a remote and hypothetical matter." Preston & Kelly, supra note 128, at 127; cf.
Shepherd, supra note 182, at 580-81 (conceding that it is difficult to know with sufficient certainty
what Terri Schiavo would have wanted but approving the court's decision since there should be a
strong presumption against continuing care for a patient in a PVS).
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about what most people would want in assessing the evidence. If we
imagine Professor Cantor as a judge, he might readily credit even frag-
mentary evidence and thus find that the patient would want to avoid a
horrific situation that the guardian had posited as possible: that she
might be aware of her situation yet unable to hear, see, speak, or inter-
act. 192 But a Judge Ashcroft or Gonzales,' 93 each with a strong belief in
the value of human life, might be far more skeptical of Michael Schi-
avo's witnesses, concurring with the majority in Cruzan that "there is no
automatic assurance that the view of close family members will necessa-
rily be the same as the patient's would have been had she been con-
fronted with the prospect of her situation while competent."' 194 Indeed,
the evidence presented in Cruzan - Nancy Cruzan's statement during a
"somewhat serious conversation with a housemate friend that if sick or
injured she would not wish to continue her life unless she could live at
least halfway normally"'' 95 - seems at least as specific as the evidence in
Schiavo. In Cruzan, however, the Missouri Supreme Court determined
that this statement did not meet the requisite evidentiary standard.
196
192. WOLFSON, supra note 8, at 4 (referring to "Hypothesis III"). Professor Cantor has written
numerous articles advocating a standard that would facilitate withdrawing medical treatment from
those with extremely low quality-of-life prognoses. See, e.g., Norman L. Cantor, Discarding
Substituted Judgment, 48 RUTGERS L. REV. 1193, 1197 (1996) [hereinafter Cantor, Discarding
Substituted Judgment]; Norman L. Cantor, On Kamisar, Killing and the Future of Physician
Assisted Death, 102 MICH. L. REV. 1793, 1842 (2004) [hereinafter Cantor, On Kamisar]; Cantor,
supra note 22, at 193. Justice Brennan appears to adopt a similar orientation in Cruzan,
repeatedly referring to Nancy Cruzan's condition as one that many would find "an ignoble end" or
"humiliating." Cruzan v. Dir., Mo. Dep't of Health, 497 U.S. 261, 310-11 (1990) (Brennan, J.,
dissenting).
193. As Attorneys General, both John Ashcroft and Alberto Gonzales advocated for positions
advancing a "culture of life" against claims for physician-assisted suicide or abortion. See, e.g.,
Gonzales v. Oregon, 126 S. Ct. 904, 924 (2006) ("The Government contends ordinary usage of
[the words 'medical' or 'medicine'] ineluctably refers to a healing or curative art, which by these
terms cannot embrace the intentional hastening of a patient's death."); Oregon v. Ashcroft, 368
F.3d 1118, 1123 (9th Cir. 2004) ("With a change of administrations came a change of
perspectives. On November 9, 2001, newly appointed Attorney General John Ashcroft reversed
the position of his predecessor and issued the Directive at issue here. The Ashcroft Directive
proclaims that physician assisted suicide serves no 'legitimate medical purpose' . . . and that
specific conduct authorized by Oregon's Death With Dignity Act 'may render [a practitioner's]
registration... inconsistent with the public interest and therefore subject to possible suspension or
revocation."').
194. Cruzan, 497 U.S. at 286.
195. Id. at 268.
196. Cruzan v. Harmon, 760 S.W.2d 408, 424 (Mo. 1988). The difference here is one of legal
standards rather than sufficiency of evidence: while the standard in both Florida and Missouri is
"clear and convincing," the Missouri courts frame the issue as requiring evidence of statements
about the specific situation facing the patient, while Florida accepts statements evidencing a more
general orientation toward withdrawal of treatment. Noah, supra note 113, at 111-12; cf In re
Jobes, 529 A.2d 434, 444 (N.J. 1987) (allowing a decision to withdraw treatment, absent any
explicit evidence of the patient's wishes, based on "his or her relevant philosophical, theological,
and ethical values").
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Perhaps most importantly, the private bioethics consultation/media-
tion can assess the effect that the decision would have on families, an
effect that the patient, if competent, would likely also have taken into
account.197 A fundamental dilemma that many scholars have recognized
is that the law seemingly demands that the family, as surrogate deci-
sionmakers, take into account only the patient's wishes and interests as
opposed to their own. Yet the two sets of wishes and interests cannot be
fully disentangled. The problem is not simply that families are often
incapable of separating them; rather, it is that these issues are inextrica-
bly intertwined for most of us.' 98 When I think about myself as some-
one facing an end-of-life situation or as someone in a PVS, one of my
concerns is to advance my family's interests. I do not want them to
suffer by seeing me in this condition (even if I myself will be unable to
experience pain or indignity). I do not want my care to drain my fam-
ily's resources, which I would want available for other needs. Indeed,
one reason people execute living wills is to avoid imposing the painful
process of choice on their loved ones, just as some people make their
own funeral arrangements not merely to ensure that the funeral process
coincides with their wishes, but also to relieve their family from the
stress and burden of having to do so upon their death.
What if we accept as a background presumption that most people
are both liberals and communitarians: they want the freedom to advance
their own individual goals, but they also recognize and value family con-
nections. Where a patient has not indicated that she would want liberal
individualism alone to be the guiding principle for end-of-life decision-
making, we may best advance her interests and presumed wishes by
encouraging the family to decide on her behalf. 199 This is most clearly
so when the family is in agreement. When the patient is permanently
incompetent to decide for herself and the choice is within the range of
ethical acceptability, we should not force the family to defend its choice
197. See Glover, supra note 60, at 1168; Jecker, supra note 185, at 66; Rhoden, supra note
185, at 440.
198. An AARP survey showed that over two-thirds of respondents indicated that among their
significant concerns regarding end-of-life situations was that they not be a burden to family and
friends. See AARP NORTH CAROLINA END OF LIFE SURVEY: AFRICAN AMERICAN MEMBERS 12
(2003), available at http://assets.aarp.org/rgcenter/health/nc-eol-aa.pdf. This point has been
extensively examined in the literature. See, e.g., DOLGIN & SHEPHERD, supra note 23, at 743-49;
Rhoden, supra note 185, at 402. As Justice Brennan pointed out in Cruzan, a patient may wish to
avoid "visiting a prolonged and anguished vigil on [her] parents, spouse, and children." Cruzan,
497 U.S. 261 at 311 (Brennan, J., dissenting).
199. James L. Nelson, Taking Families Seriously, HASTINGS CTR. REp., July-Aug. 1992, at 6,
11-12; cf. Jennifer Nedelsky, Reconceiving Autonomy: Sources, Thoughts and Possibilities, 1
YALE J.L. & FEMINISM 7, 10 (1989) (suggesting that autonomy, properly reconceptualized,
recognizes that people are not atomistic; rather values are "shaped by ... the relationships that are
a part of one's life").
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to a judge. This can also be true when the ultimate agreement among
the family is the result of a complex discussion process, often conducted
with the aid of an outsider trained to facilitate their discourse and rooted
in shared concern for the patient's wellbeing.
When we take the issue to court, these communitarian, familial
concerns cannot be a genuine part of the decisionmaking process2z° We
ask the court and witnesses to assume that the patient considers only her
own interests. In discussing the Quinlan case, Professor Burt stated that
"[i]f Karen were determined to be utterly self-centered in her delibera-
tions, disdainful of the consequences to others in pursuit only of her
most selfishly conceived interests, continuation of the life-support appa-
ratus would be the most rational course for her." '' Legal criteria seem-
ingly call on a court to assess what patient A would want according to a
matrix that does not allow the court to recognize fully the kind of person
patient A was. At the same time, these legal criteria obscure the ways in
which these impossible demands are elided as witnesses craft their testi-
mony in light of the criteria. The testimony implicitly reflects the wit-
ness' understanding of what patient A, as a wife, mother, or sister, would
have wanted, and it takes into account what the husband, son, or brother
who testifies believes (and believes that patient A believes) is best for
patient A, but the witness cannot do so explicitly. 02
In contrast to the adjudicative process, the consultant-guided pro-
cess encourages a discussion in which the parties to an end-of-life dis-
pute can recognize the tragic choice they collectively face,20 3 articulate
their values, and ideally develop a solution that accords with the particu-
larized congeries of values that are most significant to the patient and to
them °.2 1 Both the process and the outcome are more consistent with
what most people would want when they are in patient A's position.
200. Cf Pollack, supra note 134, at 518, 523 (suggesting that courts engage in legal fictions to
obscure the fact that they rely on evidence of much more than the patient's wishes, narrowly
construed).
201. BURT, supra note 136, at 151.
202. Pollack notes that although the substituted judgment and best interest tests are often stated
separately, "the tests should be viewed not as a dichotomy, but as a continuum of subjective and
objective information about the patient that will support a reliable decision." Pollack, supra note
134, at 518. To insist that the family may only testify to a subset of the concerns that they and the
patient share, as the legal rules often do, is to make the process dishonest. The familial concerns
will be part of the process, even if not articulated as such. See Newman, supra note 58, at 54-55
(discussing some of the familial concerns).
203. Unlike substituted judgment, which Dresser & Robertson, supra note 136, at 240, criticize
as avoiding the acknowledgement of tragic choices, this process allows the participants to face the
tragic choice without any a priori ranking of the values that should inform it.
204. See DUBLER & LIEBMAN, supra note 33, at 9-12 (praising bioethics mediation for its role
in developing norms within the community formed around the end-of-life choice for this patient);
cf. Cohen, supra note 53, at 279 (stressing the value of the consultative process in encouraging a
dialogue among the parties); Pollack, supra note 134, at 536-38.
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Studies consistently show that people, perhaps especially the ill or eld-
erly, who are overreoresented among the populations likely to face end-
of-life issues, deeply value the relationships they have with their fami-
lies and their families' interests.20 5 People want a process that defers to
their family's decisions because they believe that the family is best situ-
ated to know what they would want, or because they view the family's
harmonious collaboration in deciding the issue as valuable in and of
itself.
206
The failure to appoint a surrogate or to make an advance directive
may be the result of insufficient knowledge or connection to the legal
system or of psychological unwillingness to think about one's own
physical deterioration or death. However, the lack of an advance direc-
tive may instead reflect, at some level, a preference not to decide, but
rather to choose to have one's family do so.211 "[S]urely some . . .
patients prefer family choice over the opportunity to make [their] own
choices in advance," despite the risk that the choice would be different
than the one they would themselves have made. 0 8
C. Other Reasons to Prefer Consultation to Adjudication
I have suggested here a particular view of the criteria that should
guide end-of-life decisionmaking. But if we recognize that there is an
essentially irresolvable dispute on this question, that fact provides
another reason to avoid litigation where possible. A judicial process
must be guided by some predefined decisional criteria if it is to be rec-
ognized as "law." The scholars who have written on the subject of end-
of-life decisionmaking, and the courts that have ruled upon such issues,
have proffered a variety of approaches a decisionmaker might follow
when there is no clear and specific advance directive.
First, they propose a number of different substantive decisional cri-
teria. Some seemingly focus only on substituted judgment2" or on sub-
stituted judgment as the preferred criterion, but with the patient's best
205. See discussion supra note 198.
206. See, e.g., MEISEL & CERMINARA, supra note 16, at 3-52, -53; Boozang, supra note 100, at
552; High & Turner, supra note 171, at 316. Like views on appropriate end-of-life treatment
choices, views on who should make this decision and the role of family are culturally inflected.
One study indicated that Mexican and Filipinos are more likely than Euro-Americans to value a
family-centered decisionmaking model. Cf Terry et al., supra note 176, at 291.
207. See Allen & Shuster, supra note 173, at 243 (patients may "choose to abdicate decision-
making responsibility to physicians or familial proxies").
208. DoLGIN & SHEPHERD, supra note 23, at 759.
209. See, e.g., MEISEL & CERMINARA, supra note 16, at 4-7 (describing substituted judgment
standard in the context of the hierarchy of standards).
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interest a permissible alternative criterion 2 " at least when there is insuf-
ficient evidence of the patient's wishes.2" ' Others propose that the
patient's current best interest is ordinarily the proper criterion when she
is permanently incompetent. 2 '
Second, insofar as substituted judgment is used, scholars and juris-
prudes vary in how the criterion should be defined. Should it consist
solely of what the patient would want if she were thinking only of her
own interests?2" 3 Or should it include the patient's concern for the
impact of the decision on her family? 1 4 If the latter may be considered,
how certain must it be that this patient wished to take this impact into
account? Should there be a strong default presumption that people con-
sider familial impact in making end-of-life decisions? 1 5 Should the
decisionmaker apply a rule that people ought to take familial impact into
account and, thus, include these concerns at least absent clear evidence
that this patient was unusually self-centered?
2 16
210. Buchanan, supra note 50, at 214-15, suggests that substituted judgment, unlike an
advance directive, can be ethically limited by the patient's interests.
211. § 765.401(2), FLA. STAT. (2006); In re Conroy, 486 A.2d 1209, 1231-32 (N.J. 1985); 1
PRESIDENT'S COMM'N, MAKING HEALTH CARE DECISIONS, supra note 114, at 180-81.
212. See, e.g., Dresser & Robertson, supra note 136, at 236, 240 (rejecting rule that previously
competent patient's autonomy should be dominant criteria in favor of promoting the then-existing
patient's best interest). Some commentators stress the importance of avoiding the indignity of
invasive treatment. While this might have been the patient's clearly articulated prior view, it is
often asserted as an aspect of her current best interest as most people would understand it, even in
situations where the patient herself no longer possesses the cognitive capacity to experience
indignity. See Cantor, On Kamisar, supra note 192, at 1840; Rebecca Dresser, Life, Death, and
Incompetent Patients: Conceptual Infirmities and Hidden Values in the Law, 28 ARIZ. L. REV.
373, 374 (1986). But see DOLGIN & SHEPHERD, supra note 23, at 747-48 (questioning whether
indignity should only factor into the decision insofar as the patient has the capacity to experience
indignity).
213. See 1 PRESIDENT'S COMM'N, MAKING HEALTH CARE DECISIONS, supra note 114, at 180
(calling for a stringent evidentiary standard to demonstrate that people would disregard their self-
interest in order to reduce the burden on their families); cf. John A. Robertson, Assessing Quality
of Life: A Response to Professor Kamisar, 25 GA. L. REV. 1243, 1250-51 (1991).
214. See, e.g., Boozang, supra note 100, at 549; Cantor, supra note 22, at 192 (noting that most
people would want the effect on family to be considered); Dresser & Robertson, supra note 136,
at 240 (authors would allow consideration of the impact on the family, but as a secondary concern
vis-A-vis the patient's current best interest); Glover, supra note 60, at 1165.
215. See In re Jobes, 529 A.2d 434, 444 n.10 (1987) (noting that people care about the impact
on their families and any evidence of this can be considered as part of substituted judgment). The
Schiavo judge accepted that the effect on the family was part of what Terri Schiavo would have
considered, though there was no reference to any particular statement from her supporting this
conclusion. See In re Guardianship of Schiavo, 780 So. 2d 176, 180 (Fla. 2d Dist. Ct. App. 2001).
216. Glover, supra note 60, at 1166 ("The family is a necessary part of health care
decisionmaking because the patient himself or herself should make decisions as a family
member."); Hardwig, supra note 178, at 6 (implying that a patient's treatment decisions should
not be made in isolation of their effects on the patient's family). Nelson argues that families are
entities that have moral significance and collective values and thus they should be recognized "(at
least oftentimes) [as] valuable in themselves," not just sources for determining and advancing the
patient's ends. Nelson, supra note 199, at 7.
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What relevance, if any, should the proxy's own views regarding the
right outcome have? Some have recognized that appointed proxies often
do not accurately predict what the patient would have chosen. Does this
make deference to the proxy inappropriate or even illegitimate? Or
should we nonetheless defer to the proxy's choice because the patient
chose the proxy? Or should we so defer only if the patient was explic-
itly made aware of the frequency of patient-proxy disjunctures and none-
theless chose to appoint a proxy?
2 1 7
Some of these disputes are embedded in arguments over what
"autonomy" means in the end-of-life context.218  Some advocate that
decisions reflect the obligation to advance autonomy, narrowly con-
strued.21 9 Those arguing for more inclusive criteria frequently state that
they are still seeking to advance the patient's autonomy, but that auton-
omy, properly understood, includes the patient's choice to consider the
impact on her family 220 or to defer to the proxy's decisions. 2 1  Others
construe autonomy narrowly, but argue that it should be tempered by
other values.222
217. See, e.g., BUCHANAN & BROCK, supra note 22, at 101-02 (acknowledging that patients
who assign proxies are leaving decisionmaking to the proxies absent explicit directives).
218. This dispute is sometimes articulated in the language of "specific autonomy," i.e., the
desire that a person's particular wishes be followed versus "general autonomy," which can
include a person's preference that his or her desired process be used for making treatment
decisions.
219. See Pope, supra note 166, at 145-46 (asserting that people want to exercise specific
autonomy and calling for a much more detailed process of constructing advance directives to
further this goal).
220. Bruce Jennings, The Liberal Neutrality of Living and Dying: Bioethics, Constitutional
Law, and Political Theory in the American Right-to-Die Debate, 16 J. CONTEMP. HEALTH L. &
POL'Y 97, 102, 104, 119 (1999); cf MARY SIMMERLING, CHOOSING TO BE HARMED: AUTONOMY
AND ITS LIMITS IN LIVING ORGAN DONOR TRANSPLANTATION 111-16 (2005) (providing a
persuasive critique of concepts of autonomy in the organ donor context that fail to recognize that
decisions reflecting our concerns about familial impact can embody autonomy properly
understood, since patients make their decisions within webs of intrafamily care and felt
obligation); Nedelsky, supra note 199, at 12 (suggesting that what allows autonomy are our
"relationships with parents, teachers, friends, loved ones"); Stephen Sapp, Death on Whose
Terms? Crossing the Great Divide Between Patient Autonomy and Family/Community 18 (Mar.
24, 2003) (unpublished manuscript, on file with the University of Miami Law Review) ("[W]e
might be doing violence to someone's autonomy by forcing that person to exercise it when he/she
would rather let a trusted and loved family member make the decision.").
221. See Sapp, supra note 220, at 18; see also Hawkins et al., supra note 164, at 108 (noting
that "there is accumulating evidence to suggest that patients may, in fact, have little desire to exert
[the] type of specific control over end-of-life medical decisions" embodied in advance directives);
Orentlicher, supra note 5, at 1280 ("The choice of a surrogate decisionmaker is just as much an
exercise of autonomy as the giving of a specific treatment instruction. As long as people
understand that their surrogates may not choose exactly as they would have, the exercise in
autonomy is a meaningful one. The important point is that the patient has decided how the
decision will be made.").
222. See Boozang, supra note 100, at 549; Jerry A. Menikoff et al., Beyond Advance Directives
- Health Care Surrogate Laws, 327 NEw ENG. J. MED. 1165 (1992) (both arguing that a narrow
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Finally, courts and commentators differ as to the specificity with
which the patient's wishes must be expressed (i.e., the substantive stan-
dard) and the requisite degree of certainty that those were the patient's
wishes (i.e., the burden of proof).223 Those who would impose a greater
degree of specificity or a higher evidentiary burden or both are, in effect,
imposing a relatively strong default rule as part of the legal requirements
- whether that rule is to continue life-sustaining medical treatment
because the state should choose life224 or to withhold it either because
most people would not want to be kept alive in those circumstances 225 or
because of healthcare resource allocation concerns.226
Many of these positions can be articulately and persuasively
presented. Neither logic, nor evidence, nor indisputable ethical princi-
ples can tell us which is "correct." Yet, insofar as the decision is one
delegated to judges, some rule must be chosen.227 Whichever it is, the
focus on autonomy wrongly excludes a meaningful role for families); Nelson, supra note 199, at 7
(communal values of family as an entity should be considered and the autonomy of the patient not
"privileged"); Rhoden, supra note 185, at 377 (arguing that courts engage in a legal fiction of
taking these broader considerations into account by construing as relevant to autonomy facts that
do not really fit within that concept); see also Jennings, supra note 220, at 104 (rejecting focus on
autonomy in favor of attending to the question of what constitutes "good dying"); Schneider,
supra note 47, at 413; Susan M. Wolf, Foreword: Bioethics - From Mirror to Window, 15 ST.
Louis U. Pun. L. REV. 183 (1996) (urging a reorientation of bioethics generally away from its
privileging of autonomy over other values such as communitarianism or social justice). See
generally Hardwig, supra note 178 (construing autonomy narrowly but stating that ethical
consideration may require taking familial impact into account); Nelson, supra note 199 (values of
family as an entity should be considered).
223. See generally MEISEL & CEPMINARA, supra note 16, at 3-132 to -134 (explaining the
importance of not conflating these two issues).
224. 0. Carter Snead, The (Surprising) Truth About Schiavo: A Defeat for the Cause of
Autonomy, 22 CONST. COMMENT. 383, 391 (2005); see also In re Conroy, 486 A.2d 1209, 1232
(N.J. 1985) (concluding that when there is not sufficiently clear evidence of the patient's wishes,
treatment can be withdrawn only when "the net burdens of his prolonged life . . . markedly
outweigh any physical pleasure, emotional enjoyment, or intellectual satisfaction that the patient
may still be able to derive from life" (emphasis supplied)). See generally David F. Forte, The
Role of the Clear and Convincing Standard of Proof in Right to Die Cases, 8 ISSUES L. & MED.
183 (1992) (describing the clear and convincing evidentiary standard's status as a due process
requirement).
225. See, e.g., Cantor, On Kamisar, supra note 192, at 1840.
226. See, e.g., BUCHANAN & BROCK, supra note 22, at 194-96 (explaining that where patients
are in a PVS, they have no quality of life and their prior wishes might be overridden by concerns
for distributive justice). As Bloche notes, there are toxic effects when resource allocation issues
appear as covert rationing rather than as an explicit national conversation over the "conflict
between efforts to limit medical spending and insistence on all possibly beneficial care." Bloche,
supra note 127, at 2373.
227. Alternatively, the decisional rule can be one that simply authorizes the judge to decide
after evaluating a laundry list of factors. Cf. § 61.13(3), FLA. STAT. (2006) (authorizing a judge to
determine custody of children in their best interest, after evaluating twelve specific factors plus
"[a]ny other fact considered by the court to be relevant"). Such almost-unfettered judicial
discretion is less desirable than a decision reflecting the discretionary choice of those more closely
involved.
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decision will incorporate certain value judgments and reject others that
many citizens strongly hold. And, it will do so on matters intensely
important to the people involved. By instead adopting a rule of strong
deference to the consultant-guided choice of the family, healthcare pro-
fessionals, and proxy, we encourage norm building within a community
created to deal with this tragic choice.228 We simultaneously minimize
the number of occasions when the state must apply generalized, formal-
ized, and yet contestable value choices.229
In situations where the patient has executed an advance directive or
named a substitute decisionmaker, I concluded above that we should
accept the role of litigation when necessary to ensure that her choices are
respected even if those currently able to participate in decisionmaking
would choose otherwise. That conclusion was based on the importance
of autonomy.
Autonomy is less significant where there is no advance directive.23 °
Or, perhaps, more accurately, autonomy's meaning is different in this
context and can also include the patient's wish to let others take the lead
in making the relevant decision.231 Thus, in that situation I believe we
should accept the legitimacy of a decision that arises from the alternative
dispute resolution processes discussed here, even if it might be different
than what a court would have decided. The family's consensus choice is
the best alternative among the limited range of outcomes. It is not much
less likely to advance the patient's explicit views than a trial judge's
228. See DUBLER & LEBMAN, supra note 33, at 8; see also Glover, supra note 60, at 1167
("We need to shift the focus in our accounts of moral adjudication away from the moment of
individual choice to the process of collective reflection on the goods at stake in the choice.")
(quotations and internal citation omitted)).
229. In effect, I suggest here a melding of classical liberalism: that the state should not
determine the content of the good life but instead provide a structure that allows individuals to
develop and implement their own views and communitarianism since values are to be developed
and implemented within concrete communities formed to deal with the dilemmas raised by end-
of-life issues for particular patients. See Moreno, supra note 97, at 24. Some commentators,
uncomfortable with the degree of deference to the consensus view suggested here, yet
acknowledging the undesirability of requiring judicial oversight, propose a range of rather peculiar
intermediate institutions to assume the decisionmaking role. See, e.g., Krupp, supra note 112, at
127-28 (decision to be made by an attorney provided by the facility after a mini-trial); Moore,
supra note 61, at 443 (discussing the implementation of a panel of three doctors whom the
healthcare facility appointed to help make surrogate decisions). See generally Amitai Etzioni, A
Communitarian Approach: A Viewpoint on the Study of the Legal, Ethical and Policy
Considerations Raised by DNA Tests and Databases, 34 J.L. MED. & ETHics 214 (2006).
230. Emanuel and Emanuel recognize the same limitations on ensuring with certainty that the
proxy's decision actually reflects the autonomous choice the patient would have made. They then
conclude that since this is not in fact advancing autonomy, the determination should not
necessarily be left in the family's hands, but should reflect "the articulation of some shared
community standards for treating the incompetent, even if these are only procedural standards
permitting the family power over the patient." Emanuel & Emanuel, supra note 171, at 2070.
231. Orentlicher, supra note 5, at 1279-80.
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determination, and it is more likely to embody the patient's wishes and
her best interest (at least as they are understood by those closest to her).
Finally, the consultant-guided process is least likely to embody some-
one's view about "what people in general would want in that situation,"
which has a tendency to become, in effect, a question whether we as a
society believe this is a life worth living.2 32 Doubtless, with advances in
medical care and skyrocketing medical costs, we are likely to have no
choice but to confront that question. We should not do so in the context
of deciding what to do about particular patients, however, but collec-
tively, legislatively, and with the requisite thoughtful, painful honesty.
To be sure, the interposition of a bioethics consultation/mediation
is not risk-free. The participants could ignore the patient's clear wishes.
The physicians or others could exercise unwarranted dominance in
imposing their views on others. The patient or surrogate's legal rights
could be overridden. Illegitimate concerns could infect the decision.
These dangers are real.233 The issue, however, is whether such dangers
are sufficient to raise doubts about the legitimacy of encouraging such
consultations. I believe the answer is no.
First, all these risks increase if a decision is made at the patient's
bedside, without the intervention of a bioethics consultant/mediator.
Second, even insofar as an adjudicative process would mitigate these
harms,2 34 emotional and financial costs may deter people from going to
court. Third, adjudication, in this context, suffers from many of the
same dangers. The patient is not a party except, perhaps, through the
legal fiction of a guardian ad litem. Healthcare professionals may still
dominate the process by articulating their positions as based on irrefuta-
ble medical facts. While the family or the proxy may be able to bring in
other medical experts to contest these assertions, a decisionmaker who
lacks medical expertise may too readily defer to the views of the treating
physicians. The interposition of attorneys may, but need not, create a
more level playing field, while the legal process will almost certainly
make it more difficult for participants to articulate concerns outside the
232. Thus I reject Justice Stevens' position in Cruzan, which calls for a rule that would have
the state act so as to "give[ ] appropriate respect to [Nancy Cruzan's] own best interests," which,
he suggests, is an objective standard that reflects his and the guardian's assessment of her quality
of life, with little mention of her own desires. Cruzan v. Dir., Mo. Dep't of Health, 497 U.S. 261,
331 (1990) (Stevens, J., dissenting). Indeed, he later proposes a constitutional rule that would
allow the withdrawal of life-sustaining medical treatment when it was concluded that it was in the
patient's best interest, even in the absence of any indicia of her wishes, as where she had never
confronted the issue or had always been incompetent. Id. at 350.
233. See, e.g., Hoffman, supra note 33, at 825; see also supra notes 76-80 and accompanying
text. See generally KRrrEK, supra note 78, at 18-19 (discussing power imbalances).
234. See Menkel-Meadow, supra note 98, at 2663-65 (discussing the importance of assessing
the appropriateness of adjudication or alternative dispute resolution within the specific context).
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narrow range of those that are deemed legally relevant. While the court-
house doors must always remain open, there is no reason to assume that
the processes behind those doors will effectively eliminate the potential
problems a consultation/mediation process might raise. Thus, we should
not be concerned if, in most cases, no one brings the case to court.
RECOMMENDATIONS AND CONCLUSIONS
What might we learn from the above inquiry? First, bioethics inter-
ventions could be very valuable in Schiavo-like situations.
Without supplanting the triad of patient, family, and physician, ethics
committees provide a forum to which the decision-makers can turn
when confronted with the perplexing choices generated by the
biotechnological revolution. The committee ensures that the interests
of all parties, especially those of the incapacitated person, have been
adequately represented, and that the decision reached lies within the
ranges of permissible alternatives.235
There are a few modest steps that might be taken to make bioethics
consultations more available and accessible. First, more hospitals and
other healthcare facilities should provide trained consultant/
mediators. 36 While some mechanism for dealing with bioethics ques-
tions must exist in every JCAHO-accredited healthcare facility, that
mechanism may be only a formal ethics committee with some or all of
the drawbacks and limitations described above.237 JCAHO or state
licensing boards should at least require hospitals to report on whether
they have a consultation/mediation process available, how its availabil-
ity is effectively communicated to patients, proxies, and families, how
frequently it is invoked, and how successful it has been in resolving or
reducing conflict.23 8 Such systems, or any form of structured bioethics
process, may not be generally available in the kinds of skilled nursing
facilities in which Terri Schiavo lived.239 Perhaps cooperating arrange-
ments between these facilities and the larger hospitals in which the doc-
tors who serve the facility have admitting privileges could be designed.
235. Pollack, supra note 134, at 538-39 (internal citations and quotations omitted).
236. Cf. id. at 538-39 (suggesting that hospitals create ethics committees to assist in
decisionmaking).
237. See supra notes 34-38 and accompanying text.
238. The institution's bioethics committee could conduct this retrospective review. Ideally, the
reports of these reviews, appropriately redacted to remove identifying data, could provide the
basis for a more systematic empirical study of what processes are most appropriate and
efficacious. Such a process would apply systems for quality improvement to bioethics similar to
those that are increasingly used in regard to patient safety and quality of care. See generally
TROYEN A. BRENNAN & DONALD M. BERWICK, NEW RULES: REGULATION, MARKETS, AND THE
QUALITY OF AMERICAN HEALTH CARE (1996).
239. See In re Conroy, 486 A.2d 1209, 1236-42 (N.J. 1985).
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Furthermore, since such consultations may be most effective if offered
early, systems should be instituted to encourage facilities, social work-
ers, and nurses to keep families apprised of this resource as soon as it
appears that a tragic choice may arise.240
Second, if these kinds of consultations are a valuable aspect of end-
of-life care, funding for the consultation's modest costs might be found
through private health insurance, Medicare, or Medicaid. If we want
physicians and nurses to take the time to engage in consultation/media-
tions, this should be recognized in our compensation systems, not dis-
couraged by managed-care economics that make this time
noncompensable.24' We not only need healthcare professionals to par-
ticipate in these processes, we also need them to learn how to do so
effectively. Bioethics committees' educational role should ideally
include helping these professionals develop the skills to communicate
with patients, families, and each other - skills that would improve the
dialogue both within and outside a consultation/mediation process.2 42
The foregoing proposals place significant demands on the members
of bioethics committees as well as on the bioethics consultant/mediators.
Institutions must take care in choosing people who will fill these roles
and must provide them with support systems and access to continuing
education. 43 The people who fill these roles should be appropriately
240. See Bloche, supra note 127, at 2372-73; Dresser, supra note 119, at 8-9. The Patient Self-
Determination Act might be revised to ensure that the information provided to newly admitted
patients informs them of (1) these processes and (2) their right to invoke them. See generally
Patient Self-Determination Act of 1990, 42 U.S.C. §§ 1395i-3, 13951, 1395cc, 1395bbb (2006).
241. Cf. LA PUMA & SCHIEDERMAYER, supra note 35, at 76 (calling for a procedure or
diagnostic billing code that would recognize ethics consultants' labors); Orentlicher, supra note 5,
at 1303 (suggesting that reimbursement rules be rewritten to provide an incentive for physicians to
spend time learning the patient's views); Rich, supra note 71, at 331 (noting managed care's
impact on necessary physician-patient communication). The physician's contribution could be
recognized by designating these mediations as a separate compensable procedure or by adjusting
the compensation schedule for those healthcare situations particularly likely to lead to the
invocation of consultations/mediations. Nurses' participation is also generally important, and the
general problem of nursing shortages may adversely affect consultation/mediation.
242. See Dr. Nessa Coyle, Mem'l Sloan-Kettering Cancer Ctr., Remarks at the Brooklyn Law
School David G. Trager Public Policy Symposium: End-of-Life Care: Bioethical Perspectives and
Conflict Resolution (Feb. 8, 2007) (describing the clinical communication training program at
Memorial Sloan-Kettering Cancer Center).
243. A number of writers have stressed the skills a good consultant/mediator must have and the
concomitant necessity of communicating the need for attaining and maintaining these skills
among healthcare personnel. See, e.g., ASBH, supra note 31, at 12-16; DUBLER & LIEBMAN,
supra note 33, at 35-39. See generally ROBERT A. BARUCH BUSH & JOSEPH P. FOLGER, THE
PROMISE OF MEDIATION: RESPONDING TO CONFLICT THROUGH EMPOWERMENT AND RECOGNITION
(1994); KRITEK, supra note 78 (explaining the need for a similar set of skills and setting out
exercises to develop them among negotiation participants); Leonard L. Riskin, Mindfulness:
Foundational Training for Dispute Resolution, 54 J. LEGAL EDUC. 79 (2004).
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recognized and rewarded for this important and difficult work. 44 Gov-
ernmental bodies, private health insurance companies, foundations, and
healthcare facilities themselves should invest the needed resources.
While efforts should be made to encourage the use of such
processes, they should not be mandatory.245 Many jurisdictions require
that the parties to child custody disputes engage in mediation before they
may fully litigate their disputes.246 That model should not be followed
here. While it is appropriate to ask if a bioethics consultation/mediation
has occurred, or if a dispute has been submitted to a bioethics commit-
tee, there should be no obligation to do so. A consultation/mediation
that occurs after at least one participant has invoked a court's jurisdic-
tion is unlikely to be productive.247
Bioethical consultation/mediation is not a panacea. I believe, how-
ever, that it would benefit people facing end-of-life decisions and their
families, healthcare personnel and facilities, as well as the courts and
society as a whole, if more cases were resolved via those processes. If
this were to occur, fewer cases would risk becoming the ugly, public
fight that Schiavo ultimately was.
244. See LA PUMA & SCHIEDERMAYER, supra note 35, at 73-77 (discussing different systems
for compensating ethics consultants).
245. This mitigates the sorts of concerns Professors Grillo and Fineman have raised regarding
mandatory mediation in family law. See generally Fineman, supra note 85, at 729-30; Grillo,
supra note 85, at 1549.
246. See, e.g., CAL. FAM. CODE § 3170 (2006); OR. REV. STAT. § 107.179 (2006); Helen W.
Gunnarsson, New Rules Expedite Custody Cases: New Supreme Court Rules, Effective July 1, Ar-
Designed to Coordinate, Streamline, and, Most Importantly, Speed the Resolution of Custody
Cases, 94 ILL. B.J. 166, 166 (2006); Jean R. Sternlight, Separate and Not Equal: Integrating Civil
Procedure and ADR in Legal Academia, 80 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 681, 695 n.65 (citing N.C. GEN.
STAT. § 50-13.1 (2003); NEV. 8TH JUD. CIR. R. 5.70).
247. The healthcare facility should, however, consider the frequency with which bioethics
disputes arising at its facility result in litigation and what a high frequency might suggest about the
need for reforming those processes.
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